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The utilization of application-to-application (A2A) credentials within interpretive 
language scripts and application code has long been a security risk.  The quandaries being 
how to protect and secure the credentials handled in the main body of code and avoid 
exploitation from rogue programmers, system administrators and other users with 
authorized high levels of privilege. 
 
Researchers report that A2A credentials cannot be protected and that there is no 
way to reduce the risk of the inevitable successful attack and subsequent exploit.  
Therefore, research efforts to date have primarily been focused on mitigating the impact 
of the attack rather than finding ways to reduce the attack surface. 
 
The work contained herein successfully addresses this serious cross-cutting concern 
and proves that it is in fact possible to significantly reduce the risk of attack.  This 
reduction of risk was accomplished through implementing a method of credential 
obfuscation which applied advice with concerns utilizing a composition filter.  The filter 
modified messages containing the credentials as they were sent from the interpretive 
language script to the remote data store. 
 
The modification extracted credentials from a secure password vault and inserted 
them into the message being sent to the remote data store.  This modification moved the 
handling of the credentials from the main body of code to a secure library and out of the 
reach of attackers with authorized high levels of privilege.  The relocation of the 
credential handling code lines significantly reduced the attack surface and the overall risk 
of attack. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
The utilization of application-to-application credentials within interpretive language 
scripts and application code has long been a security trade-off.  The quandary being 
should the credentials be embedded in the code and risk exploitation from rogue 
programmers, system administrators and other users with authorized high levels of 
privilege or should the application not require password authentication at all?  The latter 
can be accomplished, somewhat securely, by running the entire process on a single highly 
audited machine, disconnecting it from the network and isolating the machine from all 
but a few trusted individuals.  Although this approach is commonplace in top secret 
government processing it is highly impractical in a commercial data processing 
environment.  Therefore, IT security experts, standards bodies and auditors alike have 
concentrated their efforts on figuring out new and ingenious ways to mitigate the impact 
from data loss rather than researching methods for securing the credentials.  The research 
presented in this paper focuses on the development of a method to address this gap and 
significantly reduce the risk of credential exploitation.  It would be naive to think that the 
What can we take on trust in this uncertain life?  Happiness, 
greatness, pride – nothing is secure, nothing keeps. 
– Euripides, Hecuba (c. 425 B.C.) 
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risk can be eliminated entirely.  No credential handling method, process or system can 
claim to be totally secure, but risk can be significantly reduced to the point where batch 
processes utilizing interpretive language scripts can be considered secure in a relative 
sense. 
This document is organized as follows; the Problem Statement section defines the 
problem being addressed and qualifies it as being research worthy.  It is followed by a 
description of the dissertation goal.  Following this section is the Relevance and 
Significance section which provides support for the problem statement and dissertation 
goal sections and addresses the questions: why there is a problem and who is impacted?  
The Literature Review section builds a foundation supporting the validity of this 
research.  Supporting evidence in this research area is gathered from the existing body of 
knowledge and is critically reviewed and analyzed.  Additional supporting evidence is 
gathered from federal laws and regulatory agencies, established auditing standards and 
generally-accepted professional guidelines and practices.  Concluding the Literature 
Review is an analysis of patent applications and third party products that attempt to 
address this problem.  The final sections present the research, analysis of findings and 
conclusions. 
Problem Statement 
The Association of Certified Fraud Examiners reported in their 2010 Report to the 
Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse (as cited in Nilsen, 2010) that on average 
companies lose 5% of their revenue to fraud and abuse.  Furthermore, researchers have 
found that 80% of the fraud and malicious activities within IT operations are related to 
the misuse of passwords (Singleton, 2002).  According to a recent Gartner report, close to 
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90% of all software attacks are aimed at the application layer (as cited in Brandel, 2009), 
yet the 2010 Global Security Survey of Financial Institutions by Deloitte and Touche 
("2010 Financial Services Global Security Study," 2010) reported that only 46% of all 
survey respondents include application security in their software development life cycle 
and that 23% of all respondents lack well-defined security policies in their development 
standards.  It was reported by the respondents that 10% of all data loss was from 
malicious software installed by employees with proper access and authentication.  Over 
70% of those surveyed have a medium to high expectation of attacks on program source 
code.  Lastly, only a disturbing 39% of the respondents reported having a high level of 
confidence in their ability to defend against insider cyber-attacks. 
To better understand the relevance of these survey statistics one must consider that 
70% of all insider attacks stem from software exploits ("Insider threat study: illicit cyber 
activity in the banking and finance sector," 2004) and that those vulnerabilities primarily 
lie within the context of software development and deployment.  A primary area of 
concern is the manner in which the connection credentials that are used to establish a 
communication channel between two applications such as a client and a database server 
are handled. 
Randazzo, Keeney, Kowalski, Cappelli and Moore (2005) found that 17% of all 
insider attacks came from administrators with legitimate privileged access rights.  Baring 
in mind that administrators may not always be trustworthy (Jaeger & Tidswell, 2001) it is 
a fairly simple task for a system administrator of questionable repute to harvest hard-
coded passwords from batch processing scripts and/or application programs stored on the 
file systems that they support.  It is an equally simple task for a rogue administrator or 
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software developer to modify a script and cause the password to be exported as it is 
received from an associated password vault. 
Chinchani, Iyer, Ngo and Upadhyaya (2005) found that a lack of a practical 
methodology has security experts believing that insider attacks are unpreventable.  They 
state that the only practical solution is to increase system monitoring, application logging 
and overall security countermeasures.  They further admit that these are all highly 
inconvenient measures that foster an atmosphere of distrust within the organization’s IT 
staff.  After conceding that little can be done to prevent such attacks they concentrate on 
presenting an enhanced threat modeling framework to help identify those applications 
which are most vulnerable and good candidates for increased vigilance.  This is a reactive 
approach that highly depends on both successful monitoring and detection of the attack, 
and more importantly, successful interception of the data before it leaves the premises.  A 
better approach would be to work towards preventing the attack from happening 
altogether.  Unfortunately, few research projects in this area recommend approaches 
aimed at addressing insider attacks proactively (Cappelli, Moore, Shimeall, & Trzeciak, 
2009). 
Shiflett (2004) emphatically warns that there is no way to hide or keep connection 
credentials safe from rogue privileged users.  He proposes a simple solution in which 
connection credentials are stored in environment variables and accessed by the script at 
the time of execution.  This method seems rather naive as environment variables must be 
stored as cleartext in files on the same system as the scripts themselves.  They are just as 
vulnerable to the same privileged user attacks as the scripts themselves.  In addition, all 
memory-stored environment variables are accessible by the program code and therefore 
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vulnerable to rogue programmer attacks.  Lastly, operating systems such as certain UNIX 
variants HP/UX, Solaris, LINUX, MAC OS X and others allow for the reporting of an 
executing process’ operating environment.  Thus, memory-stored environment variables 
are easily viewed by all users of privilege on those systems. 
Chumash and Yao (2009) also believe that due to the interpretive nature of scripts, 
it is impossible to obscure, mask or hide connection credentials from users with 
administrative access.  They identify the most common solution in current use which is to 
store the connection credentials as cleartext in files external to the script itself in a 
location outside of the script’s root file system and to include or source them in during 
the script’s execution.  Their thinking is that the credential’s location could be better 
monitored and protected than that of the script itself.  This methodology is short-sighted 
and falls prey to the same privileged user attack as if the credentials were stored in the 
script itself.  To address this concern they propose what is essentially a password vault 
which encrypts and stores the credentials in a secure environment and returns them to the 
executing script once it has been properly authenticated.  Although this method removes 
the credentials from viewing by people with read access to the script it does not prevent 
people with write access, such as administrators, from modifying the script and capturing 
the returned credentials.  There is also exposure to rogue programmers who may not have 
access to the production system that executes the script but who do have access to the 
source code and can place a logic bomb in the code that will capture the passwords and 
forward the credentials to awaiting accomplices when the script executes.  This negates 
almost all security measures on the executing system, as the attack is setup and put in 
place prior to the software rollout. 
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Further exacerbating matters, Said, Guimaraes, Maamar and Jololian (2009) found 
that there is a total lack of literature dealing with application security specifically in areas 
concerning application connection credentials.  Because of this they propose to 
indoctrinate programmers and software developers with security courses in graduate 
school curriculums.  Of the 83 institutions they surveyed only 10 had such security 
courses.  The fact that research institutions and academia in general are not recognizing 
the cleartext storage of connection credentials as a legitimate risk and wide-spread 
problem further supports the need for more research and literature on this subject.  
Educating the development staff is a solid step in the right direction, but it does not 
address the pressure to shortcut good development standards and circumvent security 
reviews due to understaffing and development cost considerations.  Further, it does not 
address in any manner, shape or form the corruptibility of administrators and software 
developers, especially in times of an economic downturn. 
Shmueli, Vaisenberg, Elovici and Glezer (2010) tell us that access control is useless 
if the attacker is a system administrator or a database administrator.  They propose a 
database encryption scheme to make the data stored in the database unreadable when the 
inevitably successful insider attack happens.  Besides being quite pessimistic in nature, 
their solution assumes the attacker will access the database with the credentials of the 
database administrator to look at the stored data.  They do not address the possibility of 
the rogue administrator capturing the connection credentials from a legitimate batch 
processing script and accessing the decrypted data with the appropriate level of access 
authentication afforded the script. 
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It is typical for many researchers to concentrate on securing the credential 
repository or fortifying the trust negotiation process and ignore the security of the 
software that negotiates the trust itself.  An example of this can be found in the Yu, 
Winslett and Seamons paper on automated trust negotiation strategies which clearly and 
emphatically tells us that they assumed that all trust negotiation software can be trusted 
(Yu, Winslett, & Seamons, 2003).  Six years later Yu, Sivasubramanian and Xie point out 
that traditional access control is embedded in application code and therefore it is 
impossible to test its effectiveness (Yu, Sivasubramanian, & Xie, 2009).  They also state 
that it is impossible to protect that application’s code from an insider attack. 
Franqueira, Cleeff, Eck and Wieringa (2010) find that few approaches consider the 
proactive prevention of insider attacks and adopt a forensic approach analyzing data 
gathered from security monitoring tool logs.  This seems to be the most common 
approach proposed by researchers.  Franqueira, Cleeff, Eck and Wieringa concentrate 
their study on what they call “external insiders” and propose that external service 
providers and their contracting customers bolster contractual agreements to require a high 
level of log data sharing so that the log analysis is not concentrated in one company or 
within a single office or location.  As with other similar forensic approaches this is 
closing the barn door after the animals have escaped.  The better approach is a 
prophylactic one in which access to the credentials is restricted to the interpretive script 
and not the administrator. 
The presence of application-to-application connection credentials within 
interpretive language scripts presents a significant risk, leaving those credentials open to 
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being attacked and exploited.  To date no methodology or framework exists that 
effectively secures those credentials and reduces that risk. 
Dissertation Goal 
Analysis of research efforts, auditing and regulatory agency standards and third 
party products tells us that most researchers have conceded that the problem as stated in 
the above Problem Statement section is unsolvable.  They have directed their research 
and recommendations to be more in line with an approach that attempts to detect the 
attack after the fact and mitigate the impact of the data loss rather reduce the risk of 
attack altogether (Salem, Hershkop, & Stolfo, 2008).  Albeit naive to state that all risk 
can be eliminated, this research shows that the risk of insider attack and exploitation of 
application-to-application credentials can be significantly reduced as measured by the 
delta between a pre-and post-risk analysis matrix. 
The method that was used for comparative analysis to measure the delta between 
the pre-and post-analysis of risk is a quantitative Decision Analysis Methodology.  
Kepner and Tregoe (1981) defined the three primary elements of analyzing alternatives 
and making good decisions as the quality of the problem definition, the quality of the 
evaluation of alternatives and understanding the impact of the alternatives.  They suggest 
that any decision process can be reduced to a mathematical formula resulting in a 
weighted quantitative index of alternatives against which an informed analysis can be 
made.  To facilitate this Kepner and Tregoe introduced the concept of a Weighted 
Decision Analysis Matrix. 
For the purposes of quantifying pre-and post-research password exploitation risk, 
the concept put forth in Kepner and Tregoe’s Weighted Decision Analysis Matrix theory 
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was used.  The required matrix consists of an array presenting pre-and post-research tests 
on the vertical axis.  The horizontal axis represents a list of attacks that were performed 
against the test scripts attempting to mine the password used in the scripts.  Additional 
detail on attack vector quantification and measurement ideology can be found in the 
“Quantifying Testing Results” section in Chapter 3. 
This research established a methodology and framework by which an interpretive 
language script, such as one written in Perl, can securely call a subroutine or function 
establishing a connection to a data store or secondary application.  The request can then 
be authenticated and have a connection handle returned to the calling function from the 
called subroutine or function.  The connection process was performed in such a manner 
as to significantly limit the ability of rogue privileged users or rogue developers from 
trapping the connection credentials for exploitation.  In addition to avoiding privileged 
user exploit threats, this framework also avoided granting the development and 
application support staff knowledge of the connection credentials which presents an 
equivalent risk of exploitation. 
Relevance and Significance 
The cleartext hard-coding of application-to-application connection credentials 
presents an industry-wide security software weakness that originates in the development 
process.  The weakness then travels with the software into production, leaving the 
production processing environment vulnerable to attack.   Logic Bomb attacks and Trojan 
Horse attacks can quite easily exploit credentials stored within interpretive scripts (Yang, 
2009).  The risk is further exacerbated when one considers that the developers of the 
software often are aware of the credentials when they embed them in the code.  These are 
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the same developers that standards bodies and audit reviews recommend having their 
access to production systems denied for security purposes. 
Further support for this as an industry-wide software development issue is bolstered 
by the listing of hard-coded credentials as a dangerous vulnerability in most security and 
auditing standards.  For example, the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), 
arguably one of the major players in the field of secure software development (Futcher & 
Solms, 2008), lists hard-coded application credentials eighth on its list of top 10 
application vulnerabilities (OWASP, 2007).  The SANS Institute, a prominent for-profit 
research and education organization, lists hard-coded credentials 21st on its list of the top 
25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors (B. Martin, Brown, & Paller, 2009).  
Unfortunately, the most common method to address these issues is a forensic one rather 
than a prophylactic approach (Salem et al., 2008). 
The primary reason so many researchers adopt a forensic approach to their research 
is the pervasive belief and subsequent acceptance that insider attacks on software and 
application-to-application credentials are unavoidable and unstoppable.  Researchers such 
as Blackwell (2009); Chumash and Yao (2009); Franqueira, Cleeff, Eck and Wieringa 
(2010); Shiflett (2004) and Shmueli, Vaisenberg, Elovici and Glezer (2010) have all 
based their papers on the acceptance of the inevitable security breach initiated by the 
privileged user.  The research presented in this paper was aimed at significantly reducing 
the risk of insider attack on application-to-application credentials and subsequently 
changing this perception. 
11 
 
Barriers and Issues 
The goal of this research was to develop a methodology by which applications that 
utilize interpretive scripting languages can be secured against the introduction of 
erroneous or intentional code logic that could open backdoors and establishes covert 
access points to production systems.   The hard-coding of production application 
credentials in cleartext into source code exposes those credentials to all development and 
administrative personnel with access to the development environment, thereby granting 
defacto access by development and administrative personnel to production processing 
systems.  In addition, this research has developed a methodology for securely handling 
application connection credentials returned to software applications from a password 
vault.  Specifically, instructions can be embedded into the logic of a program to exploit 
the returned credentials by forwarding them to a person or persons who would otherwise 
not be granted access to the targeted production system. 
To date adequate and functional solutions to these issues have not been available to 
the software development community (Boström, 2004; Edge & Mitropoulos, 2009).  The 
proliferation of password vault technology is a step in the right direction, but does not 
offer the complete solution.  Therefore, regulatory agencies, standards bodies and 
auditing practices have graciously accepted that there is no complete solution and 
adopted a segregation of duties approach which reduces risk.  However, this does not 
mitigate the risk altogether and is not a complete solution.  We can only surmise that 
because of this wide acceptance of risk by the professional user community funding is 
lacking for academic research.  Furthermore, a lack of funding could be a contributing 
factor in the lack of peer-reviewed papers proposing solutions.  With the exception of the 
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2004 De Win, Joosen and Piessens case study on FTP Server access controls, very few 
studies have presented practical approaches to securing application-to-application 
connection credentials (Boström, 2004; Edge & Mitropoulos, 2009).  However, the 
existence of numerous commercial password vault offerings and the ever-growing 
number of patent applications attempting to secure the returned credentials seems to 
support that research in this area is viable and is taking place. 
Summary 
The position held by researchers that nothing can be done to reduce the risk to 
application-to-application credentials used in interpretive language scripts is unfortunate.  
Even more unfortunate is that research is now focused on mitigating the impact of attack 
exploits that are considered inevitable.  This phenomenon is exacerbated by the 
acceptance by standards bodies and auditing societies who recommend segregation of 
duties as the primary defense for handling attacks coupled with enhanced monitoring 
tools that reduce the time between attack and discovery.  Better monitoring leads to faster 
discovery, which lends itself to reduced exploit impact.  The hypothesis that it is 
impossible to reduce the risk of exploit to application-to-application credential in 
interpretive language scripts is wrong.  The research presented in this work proves that 
the risk can be significantly reduced.  
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
In 1990 the Expect language was introduced by Don Libes (1990).  Expect enables 
two programs that would normally interact with humans to interact with each other. In his 
paper he clearly states that “Using Expect, it is possible to create a script that solves the 
passwd problem.”  He is referring to using Expect scripts to hold passwords and submit 
them to other applications that would normally require an interactive password 
submission.  Arguably, Libes’ work is the foundation of modern day batch processing.  
He fails to mention, or even consider, the risk of embedding credentials in a script.  Later 
on in 1993 he published his second paper where he introduces Kibitz, which is an Expect 
add-on that is platform independent and seems to correct the password-embedding issue 
by allowing the script to ask the executing human for the password (Libes, 1993).  Libes, 
however, states that this password-asking ability is for portability and never considers it 
for security.  He reasons that the script may need to connect to multiple targets using 
different passwords.  Therefore, storing a password in the script becomes inconvenient. 
In 1994 Libes published a third paper entitled “Handling Passwords with Security 
and Reliability in Background Processes” in which he presents five techniques for using 
the Expect language (Libes, 1994a).  The last three techniques are centered on hard-
coding the password in the Expect script. He addressed the security concerns by 
proposing the scripts be permissioned so that only root level privileges can access them.  
No mind is paid to consider the risk of exploit from those possessing root level privileges 
on the system.  Later that year Libes published another paper moving Expect into the X-
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Windows environment. Again, he extolls the virtues of using Expect to handle embedded 
credentials and never considers the risks (Libes, 1994b). 
Libes’ one mention of security in the Kibitz add-on, which asks the user for the 
password, works well in theory.  However it breaks down quickly when one considers the 
large number of batch processing scripts that run each night processing data from the 
day’s business.  Such is the case in brokerage houses, banks and other financial 
institutions.  By its nature a batch processing script is designed to run automatically and 
unattended.  Requiring manual intervention in the running of hundreds or thousands of 
batch processing scripts is nearly impossible and presents a security breach unto itself. 
Two years after Libes published his last work on the subject, Mavrikidis (1996) 
warned against hard-coding passwords in MVS and UNIX scripts and proposed using a 
password repository to store the passwords so they cannot be harvested from the source 
code.  The author also stressed the need for intrusion detection systems and log 
monitoring as a final step in protecting the processing environment.  Unfortunately, no 
attention was paid to the rogue system administrator and/or rogue software developer 
threat. 
In their 2009 paper, Englert and Shah (2009) identify the need to protect application 
credentials against attacks.  The authors realize that most access to computers and 
computer programs is via an ID and password.  The goal of their research was to develop 
an online safe or vault that allows users to securely store and retrieve their passwords for 
use when interacting with Internet-facing applications.  Although their solution does 
address numerous weaknesses found in online password vaults, it is designed primarily to 
be used interactively with a human being.  Their solution addresses the security of the 
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storage of the password and its eventual transmission to the requesting end user.  
However, in their conclusion they propose that the same methodology could be used to 
develop an application-to-application API.  If they were to move forward with this 
expansion of their work they would have to consider the security of the returned 
credentials once extracted from the vault and safely returned to the requesting 
application.  However, since no credence was paid to the handling of the credentials once 
returned to the human requestor in their current research, it is unlikely it will be 
considered in their future research. 
Boyen attempts to address the problem of securing credential storage and retrieval 
in his paper entitled “Hidden Credential Retrieval from a Reusable Password” (2009).  
He proposes a credential retrieval protocol that includes handshake, secure transfer and 
decryption in a single protocol operation that returns no indication of success or failure.  
Successful authentication generates the return of a plaintext password; failure returns a 
string that could be a password.  Thus an attacker using a brute force repetitive attack 
would gain no insight as to the success or failure of each attempt.  Passwords are stored 
via a process that includes the generation of a random private signing key, the hashing of 
the password and a signature.  All are then transmitted to the server over a secure 
transmission channel.  The passwords are not stored in plaintext on the server as is the 
case with some password vaults.  By storing an encrypted version of the password the 
author addresses the threat of insider attacks on the storage server itself.  Little attention 
is paid to the threat of insider attacks at the receiving end of the password retrieval 
request. 
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Boyen’s work is pointed at the forgetful human being who has a tendency to write 
passwords down.  However, because his proposed password vault is accessible via a 
network connection the interaction with the vault’s interface could be adapted for use 
with a batch process using an interpretive language script such as Perl.  Boyen did not 
consider this possibility when analyzing the success of his work or in any proposed future 
work. 
Zhu, Feng and Chen (2009) advise that advancements in computer security such as 
facial and fingerprint recognition help protect human-to-application credentials, but does 
nothing to protect application-to-application credentials from exploit by people with 
administrative level authorization.  To address this they suggest that access control 
policies based on behavior patterns be implemented.  Studying these patterns would 
allow for the identification of computer system users through the similarity of the user's 
behavioral patterns.  Constructing access control policies based on usage patterns has 
quite a bit of merit and allows for a more granular and finely-tuned set of policies.  
Although the authors claim this to be an effective means of combating insider attacks, 
they neglect to address insider attacks perpetrated by users with justifiable privileged 
access. 
Kostiainen, Ekberg, Asokan, and Rantala (2009) correctly point out that securely 
storing and using application-to-application credentials is essential in modern-day 
distributed applications.  They further state that the use of passwords is convenient and 
quite flexible but extremely hard if not impossible to secure.  Kostiainen, Ekberg, 
Asokan, and Rantala also point out that the use of hardware tokens as credentials are 
quite secure, but expensive and not practical.  They propose an architecture for secure 
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credential management called On-Board Credentials (ObC) which brokers connections 
between applications.  Unfortunately, this system requires an isolated and secure 
execution environment for it to be effective.  Once provisioned the requesting application 
is sent a connection key that is then used to connect to the remote application.  The key is 
subject to misuse in the same manner as that of a password returned from a password 
vault.  It would seem that the success of their methodology is keyed to the level of 
isolation the processing environment is able to achieve.  The authors point out that 
additional analysis and testing is required to determine the level of security and usability 
of their proposal. 
Blackwell (2009) states that insider attacks are on the rise and are very difficult to 
address in large part because insiders tend to possess high levels of privileged access 
rights and in-depth knowledge of system weaknesses.  They propose a three-pronged 
systematic approach to mitigating the risk.  The first is to reduce the attack surface, the 
second is to minimize impact zone and the third is to reduce the attacker’s motivation 
either through persuasion or deterrence.  They believe that by bolstering the worker’s 
morale, increasing their pay and generally reducing the cost benefit of attacking their 
employer the frequency and scope of the attacks can be reduced.  Considering that the 
United States has 5% of the global population and 25% of the world’s prison population 
(Salerno, 2009) it would seem that Blackwell’s hypothesis is flawed.  The criminal 
generally does not consider the penalty during the commission of the crime.  In fact the 
exact opposite holds true as they do not think they’ll be caught at all.  Blackwell is 
correct in his thinking that the best way to address this problem is to prevent the crime, 
although a different methodology is called for. 
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As the popularity of centralized disk storage systems grows so does the risk of 
unauthorized access to the files and data stored on those disks.  These storage systems 
have become critical components of most corporate computing environments.  Along 
with an increase in popularity and usage comes an increase in vulnerability and the risk 
of data loss and its damaging impact (Kher & Kim, 2005).  Therefore, one must 
additionally consider the risk of an insider attack on centrally stored interpretive scripts 
which contain application-to-application credentials.  A rogue system administrator with 
legitimate privileged access could perpetuate an attack on these scripts to harvest 
credentials simply by mounting a file system remotely from any number of servers that 
may or may not be adequately secured. 
Chen, et. al. address the risk of file corruption and/or deletion through insider 
attacks on centralized storage systems and propose a secure and efficient Remote Data 
Checking (RDC) scheme for network coding-based distributed storage as a means to 
catch and correct inappropriate modification to files stored on central storage systems.  In 
their research the central storage server is considered untrusted and their efforts are 
directed at preventing the destruction of files stored on the server by making those files 
recoverable.  Their solution does not address access by authorized administrators for the 
purpose of credential harvesting.  It does, however, illustrate the need to secure those 
files against attack (Chen, Curtmola, Ateniese, & Burns, 2010). 
Kernel level security policy enforcement is the most widely used security 
architecture in systems to date.  It is based on a two-tiered privilege architecture that 
allows for a single administrative super-user and all other users with no particular special 
privileges.  These non-super-users are largely restricted to accessing files owned by 
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themselves or groups in which they are members.  The elevated privilege of the super-
user is generally required to perform almost all administrative tasks.  For this reason 
super-user accounts are highly exposed, difficult to defend and a favorite target of 
adversaries (Payne, 2007). 
Payne (2007) acknowledges that cryptographic algorithms are in wide use enforcing 
networking security policies.  He explains that passive cryptographic file systems exist 
primarily to protect the confidentiality of data stored on those files systems.  Payne states 
that these systems break down when the super-user credentials have been exploited and 
the cryptographic keys obtained by attackers after compromising the privileged user’s ID.  
It is surprising that with 17% of all insider attacks coming from the administrators 
themselves (Randazzo et al., 2005) Payne did not consider rogue administrators more in 
his thinking. 
Payne (2007) proposes a system called Vaults which boasts of an enhanced access 
control system that encrypts the file system at the kernel level.  This system can prevent a 
super-user from reading a file that is owned by a non-privileged user.  This system works 
well in that it mitigates the risk of privileged users gaining access to critical files stored 
on the files system.  Payne also claims that once the kernel is fully booted it will assume 
responsibility for verifying the integrity of trusted interpreted scripts against modification 
by a privileged attacker. 
Payne’s proposed kernel level key management architecture does provide a 
cryptography based security model that goes a long way to protect user files from access 
by privileged accounts.  However, two major concerns weaken the value of the proposed 
solution.  The first is that Payne does not consider that trusted code contained in 
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interpreted scripts may have been compromised prior to being installed on the system and 
secured by Vaults.  Unless the code is meticulously reviewed prior to rollout, it is quite 
easy for a rogue programmer to plant a logic bomb in the application that will capture the 
credentials once it is installed.  Additionally, quite often system administrators are tasked 
with performing the software installs.  It is not hard for a rogue administrator to insert 
malicious code into a script during the installation process.  Programs with logic bombs 
inserted into their code can easily circumvent Payne’s secure environment as Vaults only 
monitors changes made to trusted scripts after installation. 
The second, and probably most important, concern is that anytime you modify the 
kernel of an operating system you risk voiding the manufacturer support of the system 
and software.  In some cases modifications such as that which Payne proposes may even 
void the warranty.  You also run the risk of negatively affecting the reliability of the data 
processing computations and results.  If two plus two suddenly equals five, was it the 
floating point co-processor (FPU) in the central processing unit (CPU) that went bad or 
was it the kernel modification that caused the problem?  In a highly critical computing 
environment standardized software installs are of the utmost importance.  Anything that 
modifies the kernel is generally frowned upon and not allowed in most IT organizations.  
In order to be acceptable to communities performing critical processing, his proposal 
would have to be incorporated into the kernel, certified and supported by the 
manufacturer.  Then, unless accepted by all manufacturers and made universally 
available across all platforms, the interpretive scripts accessing the Vaults environment 
lose their platform independence and in turn their portability. 
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Kher and Kim tell us that the confidentiality and integrity of centrally-stored data at 
rest can be achieved through cryptographic operations on the user side.  This encryption 
requires the use of keys provided to the user for access to the storage system.  In the case 
of Networked File Systems (NFS), which is widely used in the UNIX environment, they 
readily admit that it is the system administrators that control and issue user credentials for 
access to the shared storage.  Therefore, the administrator who issues the user’s 
credentials also has the ability to access their files masquerading as the user.  Because 
NFS treats security as an afterthought it is ever more important to avoid storing 
credentials in scripts and to secure the handling of the credentials requested by an 
interpretive language script and returned from a secure credential vault (Kher & Kim, 
2005). 
Two areas of concern that are easily addressed, but often are ignored are the 
securing of backup media such as tapes and other portable devices often stored off-site 
for disaster recovery purposes and the disposal of storage devices that are no longer 
needed (Fendler, 2004).  You can have the greatest and most secure file system in the 
world to protect interpretive language scripts with hard-coded application-to-application 
credentials, but it will all be for naught if someone were to harvest the credentials from a 
backup tape.  This is easily addressed by encrypting backup tapes.  However, only the 
newer tape devices such as LTO4, LTO5 and LTO6 (Linear Tape-Open) tape drives 
support hardware encryption ("Encryption Technology for HP StorageWorks LTO 
Ultrium Tape Drives," 2010).  Software encryption is often slow, cumbersome and not 
practical in larger installations.  Tape backup encryption is expensive and is generally not 
an option available to smaller less well-to-do organizations.  Although encryption of tape 
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backups is highly recommended it is best to not have the credentials hard-coded in the 
scripts that are stored on the backup media. 
The second concern is the disposal of storage devices that are no longer needed.  
This is more a matter of policy than a scientific concern.  All discarded storage devices 
should be wiped clean with a fairly inexpensive NSA certified degaussing device.  Secure 
disposal can also be accomplished by hiring a shredding company who will certify the 
destruction of the media.  Again, major regulated companies adhere closely to policies 
that require this.  It is the smaller, less prominent organizations or organizations that are 
not regulated or audited that are either not aware of or cannot afford to enact this policy.  
The risk could be greatly mitigated if the credentials were not hard-coded into the 
software to begin with. 
The practice of storing application credentials in cleartext in the application code, 
although frowned upon by standards bodies and internal auditing guidelines, has long 
been widely accepted as an unavoidable risk of doing business.  It is deemed to be fully 
acceptable and is a common practice among IT professionals world-wide (Chumash & 
Yao, 2009).  Chumash and Yao (2009) tell us that there is no framework available today 
that protects sensitive information from insider attacks and allows for the safe execution 
of interpretive scripts.  Furthermore, they tell us that due to the interpretive nature of the 
scripts it is impossible to protect sensitive information contained in the scripts such as 
application-to-application connection credentials.  Their approach to addressing this risk 
is one of reducing the impact of such insider attacks by focusing on early detection of 
data loss.  While it is always prudent to adopt the measures suggested by Chumash and 
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Yao, it is rather too resigned to defeat to state as emphatically as they have that it is 
impossible to reduce the risk further than that which is known and understood today. 
In part, accepting that application-to-application credentials cannot be protected 
stems from a lack of conceptual and practical security training for software developers 
("Making Security a Business Priority," 2008; Said et al., 2009).  Acceptance is also 
encouraged due to a void of functional alternatives coupled with the over-reliance on 
segregation of duties (SoD) as the primary risk mitigation methodology (Lieberman, 
2010; Singleton, 2002).  In a broad generalized sense, SoD is the concept of having more 
than one person required to complete a task.  It is alternatively called separation of duties 
and specifically within the context of IT operations it is defined as separating the 
development community from the production processing environment and limiting access 
to just those who need access to support the production environment. 
The International Organization for Standardization’s (ISO) standard on information 
technology and security techniques, ISO/IEC 27001:2005, section 11.03.01, specifies that 
no hard-coded credentials should be allowed in any automated logon process, yet no 
insight is offered as to how one would go about securing an unattended batch process 
script (ISO, 2005).  The Payment Card Industry’s (PCI) Data Security Standard, section 
8.5.16, accepts hard-coded passwords as an acceptable risk, but requires that the 
production environment protect the credentials against unauthorized use (PCI, 2009).  
This is virtually impossible if one considers that production computer systems and 
associated database management systems require real-time maintenance and support from 
system, application and database administrators who have the privileged access necessary 
to carry out their duties and also view the production script source code. 
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It is a significant when one considers the absence of warnings and the lack of 
research surrounding the hardcoding of credentials and/or the handling of those being 
returned from password vaults.  In their 1,175-page definitive guide to software security 
assessments, Dowd, McDonald and Schuh (2007) made no mention of hard-coding 
credentials in software or the risk of exploitation of credentials when returned from a 
password vault.  Another example of the absence of this issue in secure programming 
guidelines can be found in the Guimaraes, Murray and Austin (2007) paper on 
developing secure database programming courseware.  Not a single mention of hard-
coded credentials or the risk of exploiting credentials returned from a password vault can 
be found.  George and Valeva (2006) identify the lack of application-to-application 
security and defensive programming techniques in undergraduate curriculum as a root 
cause for it being ignored in professional software development shops.  This is further 
evident in Yang’s paper (2009) suggesting methods for teaching database security and 
auditing which present the entire realm of application security in terms of SQL injection 
attacks and never once mention access control or the protection of connection credentials 
as a cross-cutting concern. 
In their paper on database application security Said, Guimaraes, Maamar, and 
Jololian (2009) state that a lack of academic literature on database application security 
led them to develop courseware to educate developers, yet they still fail to mention the 
hard-coding of DBMS access credentials as a real security risk.  Because academia has 
not recognized the protection of application-to-application credentials in interpretive 
scripts as a serious security risk, undergraduate and graduate courseware is sorely lacking 
in this area (Ge & Zdonik, 2007).  It is not hard to understand why graduating students 
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who become researchers tend to ignore areas of research in which they have been given 
no educational foundation.  Furthermore, those graduating students who go on to careers 
in software development do not consider the protection of credentials in the design of 
their programs. 
The Information Technology General Controls (ITGC), in section 404 of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), requires restricted access and SoD to reduce the risk 
of fraud through unauthorized data manipulation ("Sarbanes-Oxley section 404: A Guide 
for Management by Internal Controls Practitioners," 2008).  SoD has long been thought 
of as the cornerstone of data protection (Mattsson, 2008).  Mattsson suggests that the only 
way to address this risk is to combine SoD with data encryption at the database source.  
Encrypting the data and separating the security administration function from that of the 
developer/administrator thereby protects the sensitive data from database administrator 
attack.  However, he later admits that even with these precautions the data is at risk to an 
attack from rogue administrators and developers who insert malicious code into the 
interpretive scripts and capture the returned data after its decryption. 
In the context of this discussion, segregation of duties means that the development 
community is segregated from the production processing environment (Adaikkappan, 
2009).  This is additionally supported by CoBiT (Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technology), a standard published by ISACA (Information Systems Audit and 
Control Association), which has achieved pervasive usage as a guideline for SOX section 
404 compliance.  Specifically, CoBiT sections AI 3.4 and AI 7.4 require the separation of 
developers from the production environment (ISACA, 2007). 
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SoD is the number one means for prevention of fraud and abuse in computer and 
application security.  It is widely adopted in business, industry and government, and is 
the primary remediation focus in almost all audit findings (Gligor, 1998; Jianfeng, 2009; 
Mattsson, 2008).  One area where the SoD process breaks down is in the nature of 
modern software development.  In the past almost all computer programs were written in 
a language that required compiling before execution to convert program source code from 
a human-readable form to binary code that is readable and understood by the computer’s 
operating system.  Because binary program code is not human-readable and not easily 
modified, it fits well within the SoD scenario.  Most software today is written in some 
form of interpretive scripting language such as Shell, Perl, JavaScript or BeanShell.  
These programs, called scripts, are human-readable and are essentially compiled at 
execution time.  Application connection credentials are often stored within the script’s 
code lines, thus opening up critical application access credentials for viewing by anyone 
who has read-access to the scripts (Lieberman, 2010).  Gligor found that even with strong 
encryption policies in place and a mature access control framework implemented, it is 
virtually impossible to prevent the insertion of malicious code into an application that 
would allow unauthorized persons access to sensitive data.  He concludes that to be 
effective, new administrative methods and stronger tools need to be developed that offer 
significant support for SoD policies (Gligor, 1998). 
SoD effectiveness relies heavily on the detection of the fraud itself and is only as 
effective as the incentive program that encourages employee fraud reporting and the 
detection of fraudulent acts through follow-up audits.  SoD’s level of effectiveness as a 
preventive measure is high in areas of general application usage.  It is less than effective 
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when dealing with persons who have high level access rights or super-user privileges.  
Although implementing SoD in the overall application security framework is a sound 
practice, it does little to address the risks and issues arising from modern development 
and application support practices.  Unfortunately it is most commonly relied upon as the 
end-all solution for protecting application-to-application credentials. 
Jerbi, Hadar, Gates and Grebenev (2008) note the impact of insider attacks on a 
company’s compliance with federal regulatory laws such as SOX and the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).  To address this concern they 
introduce the concept of least privilege access as a way to control administrator and 
application support personnel access to critical files, scripts and programs.  Although this 
concept does restrict access by unauthorized administrators, Jerbi, Hadar, Gates and 
Grebenev’s solution does nothing more than audit access by authorized administrators 
and application support personnel to scripts and programs containing hard-coded 
credentials.  In addition, their solution does not address malicious code embedded in 
scripts and programs prior to the migration of the software from development to 
production. 
Not securing hard-coded passwords stored in cleartext in scripts and programs as 
they migrate from development to production places a company’s production systems at 
risk.  Databases and other data stores become vulnerable to access by any and every 
developer that has had access to source code residing on development systems whether 
production system access is segregated or not (Woodbury, 2005).  This seemingly puts 
the company in severe jeopardy of violating SOX and HIPAA requirements.  Hicks, 
Rueda, St.Clair, Jaeger and McDaniel (2007) expand on the least privilege access model 
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by incorporating a multi-level security framework to control and restrict credential use.  
Their proposal is built upon three security models: the Type Enforcement (TE) model, the 
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model and the Multi-Level Security (MLS) model.  
This framework, based on the Mandatory Access Control theory, requires that all subjects 
and objects be identified and marked.  All security-sensitive operations are checked at 
runtime against a security policy to determine whether the operation should be allowed.  
This is again a sound policy; however, it does not address whether or not a file accessed 
by a qualified system administrator is for legitimate or illegitimate purposes.  
Auditors have long cautioned against hard-coding credentials in scripts, but never 
seem to offer viable alternatives beyond separation of duties.  The CPA Journal article on 
securing software (Rechtman, 2009) relies heavily on code reviews as the only sure way 
to secure software against exploits and misuse by closing security gaps before 
deployment.  The author strongly discourages hard-coding critical values into the scripts 
and programs, but totally misses the risk of hard-coding credentials.  The article also 
ignores the risk of software tampering after deployment.  Martin points out that SoD 
weakens significantly unless used in conjunction with a strong Security Information and 
Event Management system (SIEM) to track and capture suspicious system activity (A. 
Martin, 2008).  A truly efficient SEIM requires a hardened OS, such as Trusted Solaris, 
Trusted BSD or Security Enhanced Linux (SELinux), which is not economically practical 
or supportable in the average batch processing environment. 
In their consideration and acceptance of the cleartext hard-coding of application 
credentials many auditing agencies and standards bodies recommend auditing the use of 
the credentials themselves as a method to mitigate the risk presented by this practice.  For 
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instance the audit guidelines published by the Institute of Internal Auditing (IIA) accepts 
that application-to-application connection credentials held within the software are 
necessary and recommends that the use of those credentials be monitored for possible 
misuse (Bresz, Renshaw, Rozek, & White, 2007).  This seems to be a quite reactionary 
approach that is solely dependent upon the depth and chronological sensitivity of the 
audit log monitoring that takes place in the targeted firm.  To be truly effective the 
monitoring must be real-time and intelligent.  The only way to provide real-time 
intelligent monitoring is via a fully-automated log-scanning tool that can correlate 
activities across all monitored systems.  These types of monitoring systems are complex, 
expensive and require an entire staff to maintain.  In most cases they are prohibitive to all 
but the largest operations.  Anything other than real-time monitoring is at best an after-
the-fact approach that relies on the firm’s security personnel to intercept the attacker 
before the data leaves the premises or before any malicious damage reaches the point of 
non-repair.  It is a hit-or-miss approach at best. 
There are numerous commercial products available that attempt to address the 
cross-cutting concerns of secure enterprise credential management.  All products 
reviewed claim to secure application-to-application connection credentials used within 
programs and interpretive scripts.  These products are generally referred to as secure 
password repositories or password vault software products.  Although their feature sets 
vary greatly, they all have the same essential methodology.  The products store enterprise 
passwords in a secure client-server back-end database with a front-end password broker 
process through which remote agents can request and retrieve a password from the vault.  
Communication between broker and remote agent is generally encrypted with agents 
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caching requested passwords locally thereby reducing the load on the broker.  
Applications requesting a password are authenticated by the agent prior to passing the 
request onto the broker.  There are varying degrees and methods of application-
authentication used to verify the identity of the requesting application.  These 
authentication schemes differ with each vendor’s product, but all provide a similar 
method to vet the application prior to returning the requested credentials. 
The e-DMZ’ Password Auto Repository (PAR) technical product overview 
("Application Password Management Module," 2009) states: 
e-DMZ Security’s Application Password Management (APM), part of the TPAM 
Suite of privileged user and access control solutions, provides a solution to replace 
embedded passwords that are hard-coded in scripts, procedures and programs with simple 
CLI/API calls. Often overlooked, embedded passwords create back-door access accounts 
to target systems and applications that can easily be exploited. Replacing these hard-
coded passwords with programmatic calls that dynamically retrieve the account 
credential removes this often overlooked exposure. 
An analysis of the company’s product literature and a provided white paper 
("Managing Embedded Application Passwords with Password Auto Repository™ 
(PAR)," 2009) shows that the product offering protects the password up to the point 
where it is returned to the requesting application.  The product has no facility available to 
secure and protect the password after it is returned to the application.  Although this is a 
step in the right direction it falls way short of addressing the risk presented by rogue 
programmers and administrators who could embed logic bombs in the code to harvest the 
returned password. 
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The Password Manager Pro (PMP) User Guide ("Password Management API for 
Application-to-Application Password Management," 2009) makes the following claim: 
“Any application or script can query PMP and retrieve passwords to connect with other 
applications or databases, eliminating hard-coded passwords.”  No facility is provided to 
address concerns with handling the password after it is returned to the application.  This 
product does include a facility to change the password after each use, which the company 
touts as a method for securing the password it returns.  However, this falls down when 
you consider that the password could be hijacked and exploited between the time the 
password is returned from the vault and the time the password is changed.  When asked, 
the company’s technical representative admitted that there was no known solution to 
addressing the insider threat posed by compromised code exploiting the returned 
password. 
The Cyber-Ark Application Identity Management (AIM) implementation guide 
("Application Identity Management Implementation Guide," 2009) states: 
Application credentials are often stored in embedded form in the application 
code, or in a configuration file, usually in cleartext that is visible to a large 
audience. This challenge identifies a security gap and significant risk, often 
captured by auditors, where these sensitive database and application ID passwords 
are widely known and accessible to developers, help desk engineers, etc. 
This product boasts a patented password vault, a robust authentication process for 
password requestors and a highly-available, locally cached agent-based architecture that 
affords a well thought-out password protection scheme.  The company further claims that 
by removing hard-coded passwords from application code and configuration files you can 
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make “them invisible to developers and support staff.”  When questioned, a Cyber-Ark 
technical support engineer reluctantly admitted that their product cannot address the 
insider threat posed by compromised code exploiting the returned password.  They 
suggested that the passwords used by applications be changed every few hours as a 
means of mitigating this concern.  However, a password can be compromised and an 
illicit connection be made to a data store within seconds of a legitimate password request 
being made to the vault and that password being returned to the application.  This 
suggested solution can be deemed weak at best. 
A white paper from Cloakware regarding their Password Authority (PA) password 
management software suite ("Cloakware Password Authority™," 2009) boasts that “Your 
unattended servers no longer need hard-coded credentials to access other servers.”  It 
further boasts “It helps you meet your compliance requirements by eliminating shared 
and hard-coded passwords,…”  Cloakware’s product offering has a secure password vault 
backend, a local agent that caches passwords for high availability and a large assortment 
of API’s by which applications can request and receive passwords. 
Cloakware’s literature does not claim to solve the entire problem of password 
exploitation.  In a question and answer session Cloakware’s Chief Technologist Robert 
Grapes admitted that their product only “...helps to prevent developers or administrators 
from having unmonitored access to production systems.”  As with the other password 
vault technology products, Cloakware’s product offerings do not protect a legitimately 
requested and returned password from being captured and exploited once it is returned to 
the requesting application. 
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In 1999-2000 the Cloakware Corporation applied for and was granted a Canadian 
patent describing an invention in which a series of one-way hashed passwords are stored 
both in the remote resource and in the application requesting access.  With each 
successive login attempt the accessing program sends the previous password in the series 
(Johnson, Gu, & Chow, 1999).  This is a very unique approach in that it uses an 
unattended two-factor authentication scheme to authenticate the application requesting 
access.  Both the resource and the requestor need to know what the current password is 
and what the previous one was.  This prevents man-in-the-middle and replay attacks from 
capturing the password and reusing it.  While, this solution protects the transmission of 
the credentials it does not protect the housing of the credentials in the program itself.  
Granted this patent award is almost ten years old, an eternity in the context of computer 
science, but it is worth examining to show that since the patent was awarded there has 
been no significant progress made toward addressing the issue of handling and protecting 
credentials in the application-to-application authentication process. 
In their 2008 patent application Adams, Grapes, Gu, Mehan and Rong (2008), 
describe their invention as a method by which unattended software applications can 
request access to shared resources.  This is noted in paragraph 0069, claim #5 
commenting on claim #1, where they describe the process as returning resource 
credentials to the requesting application for use in establishing a connection to said 
resource.  As well thought-out as this invention is it does not address issues concerning 
what the application does with the credentials after they are surrendered to the control of 
the application.  As with the previously-explored solutions, the returned credentials are 
exposed to insider attacks by a rogue programmer who could embed password capture 
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logic into his/her programs during the development cycle and now resides in the 
production processing environment. 
Sade and Adar’s (2008) patent application addresses the issue of insider attacks on 
credentials returned to requesting applications.  The authors note that no one to date has 
effectively addressed the risk of exploitation from capturing a returned password and 
relaying it to an awaiting accomplice to use for illicit access to a remote data store.  Sade 
and Adar propose a method by which the transmission of the credentials to the remote 
application or data store is intercepted and the password replaced with one extracted from 
a password vault, assuming the requesting application is fully vetted and authenticated to 
access the vault and the remote application/data store.  Their patent application describes 
the invention as an interception module that performs intercepting methods such as 
application hooking, monitoring and intercepting network-packets, altering byte-code and 
altering operating-system drivers.  They define application hooking as intercepting calls 
to APIs and/or modifying the API behavior. 
The Sade and Adar (2008) solution, at first blush, seems quite attractive as it 
requires no modification to the requesting application code, does not use any hard-coded 
passwords placed in the code by the developers and is not subject to insider attacks in the 
form of embedded exploitive code placed in the application to trap and transmit the 
requested credentials.  It is essentially a white hat, man-in-the-middle approach to solving 
the problem at hand.  It seems that this approach would work well in situations where the 
network packets are not encrypted themselves or transmitted via SSL or TLS protocols.  
In addition, a firm understanding of each network protocol used by each individual 
vendor would be required to accomplish this.  Intercepting the network packets also 
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assumes the interception modules can overcome the deployed environment’s man-in-the-
middle defenses. 
The byte-code (binary) modification of system APIs and kernel driver code can be a 
slippery slope in which one can easily render an application, operating system or even the 
entire computer processing environment inoperable.  Furthermore, tampering with APIs 
and kernel drivers, whether good-intentioned or not, introduces legal issues regarding 
software tampering and software licensing considerations.  Lastly, the modification of the 
binary code for APIs and system kernel modules could possibly void associated support 
contracts and can cause concerns regarding system stability while running mission-
critical batch processes.  On the surface this seems like a great idea, but in the real world 
where down-time is costly, system stability is king and white hat hacking is frowned 
upon, this solution isn’t very palatable.  It does, however, demonstrate the focus of 
present-day research and the relevance of protecting passwords from insider attacks. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Overview 
The work presented here developed a method by which application-to-application 
connection credentials are better protected from various forms of attack.  A framework 
was developed that adopts concepts learned from source code obfuscation research used 
in protecting programs from reverse engineering.  Source code obfuscation is gaining an 
ever-growing level of importance in the secure software arena, affording both source 
code and binary protection in areas such as Intellectual Property (IP) and Digital Rights 
Management (DRM) (Giacobazzi, Jones, & Mastroeni, 2012).  The goal of source code 
obfuscation is to transform and obscure the program variables and the codebase to such a 
point where it becomes unintelligible to both automated and human reverse engineering 
efforts (Majumdar, Drape, & Thomborson, 2007; Sosonkin, Naumovich, & Memon, 
2003). 
Reverse engineering efforts focus primarily on transforming binary objects into 
human readable source code which can then be used for illicit purposes such as copyright 
infringement or security bypassing.  The problem addressed in this research focuses on 
code lines that are already in human readable form.  Therefore, source code obfuscation 
in a pure sense is not applicable in this research.  However, the basic principles and 
concepts derived from source code obfuscation research can be adapted and used as a 
foundation for this work.  The framework established addresses the problem of securing 
application-to-application credentials such that an interpretive language script, one 
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written in Perl for instance, can securely call a subroutine that establishes a connection to 
a data store or secondary application.  During this process the credentials used to 
establish the connection is obfuscated, thereby reducing the risk of capture and 
exploitation. 
A developmental research methodology was used to create a framework for 
application-to-application credential obfuscation.  This framework was built upon the 
following concepts; the first being the disguising and obscuring of variables that hold the 
credentials being returned from a password vault.  Obscuring storage variable names and 
breaking them up into multiple smaller variables will promote the obscurity of the 
variables and further reduce the risk of exploit. 
Because Perl is a programming language that supports object-oriented 
programming, the second concept utilized an aspect in which the pointcut handled the 
password vault call, the reception of the returned password and the opening of the 
application connection.  This takes place in the advice woven into the application 
connection open function call at runtime.  The basis for this methodology is the 
obfuscation of the credentials handling to an area of program execution that is outside the 
program code accessible by the programmer and anyone else with access to the script 
code.  This abstraction also increased the obscurity of the credentials to debugger attacks 
and memory scan attacks. 
In preparation for developing the attack vector workload, and facilitating the 
development of the above framework, a batch processing environment similar to a typical 
small business was utilized.  It consisted of a mix of computers running the three most 
prominent operating systems in use representing a typical batch processing environment.  
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They are Windows 7, Solaris 10 and Linux.  All machines used in the research were 
networked together.  A complete listing of hardware and software used in this research, 
including a network topography diagram, is available in Appendix B. 
Attack Vector Taxonomy 
Over the past three decades there have been numerous lists and taxonomies 
published to categorize vulnerabilities and attacks.  Unfortunately, the degree of 
complexity and sophistication of current day attacks and vulnerability exploits renders 
these lists and taxonomies inadequate (Weber, Karger, & Paradkar, 2005).  Within the 
context of this research the term vulnerability can be defined as a means whereby a 
hostile entity can successfully violate a system’s security.  We can also define an attack 
as the use of a tool or technique with which an attacker will attempt to detect and exploit 
a vulnerability to capture a password used in an interpretive script. 
Hansman and Hunt (2005) published a paper reviewing the various taxonomies 
used to describe network and computer attacks.  This paper reviewed early-published 
taxonomies including Bishop’s 1995 vulnerability taxonomy, Howard’s 1998 taxonomy,  
Lough’s 2001 taxonomy and that which was published by the OASIS web application 
security council.  Hansman and Hunt found that these taxonomies were too general in 
nature and weren’t all capable of adequately classifying attacks.  They proposed an 
alternative taxonomy for classifying attacks.  To illustrate this taxonomy shortcoming one 
can look at the attack patterns classified in the CAPEC (Common Attack Pattern 
Enumeration and Classification) database.  Of the 920 attack vectors classified under the 
Methods of Attack category only one sub-category deals with exploitation of privilege 
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attacks and none address credential capture attacks ("CAPEC-1000: Mechanism of 
Attack," 2011). 
The Hansman and Hunt taxonomy utilizes four dimensions for high-level attack 
classification; each of which can be broken down into levels or components which further 
granulizes the categorization.  The first dimension categorizes the attack vector, the 
second dimension categorizes attack target, the third categorizes the vulnerability and the 
fourth categorizes the attack payload (Hansman & Hunt, 2005). 
Their approach was attractive for use in this research as it allowed for attack 
categorization without specific external attack vectors or an attack vectors that are 
considered trivial.  Attacks perpetrated by system administrators who already have 
legitimate access to the system tend to trivialize the attack vector.  To illustrate the 
display of levels within a dimension, levels will be shown in the format of (level  level 
2 …level N).  Password attacks has been chosen as the first dimension’s level one 
category and exploiting implementation as the level two category, thus the first dimension 
is displayed as (Password attacks  exploiting implementation). 
The second dimension addresses the target of the attack.  In this case the target is 
the interpretive script either containing the credentials or requesting them from a 
password vault.  Therefore, (Software  application  server  interpretive script) 
seems appropriate. 
The third dimension addresses the vulnerabilities the attack exploits.  These are 
generally tied to vulnerabilities listed in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVE) database.  However, the use of the CVE database is not appropriate for our 
purposes because CVE entries are specifically tied to vulnerabilities with published 
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software programs, packages and applications.  This research is focused on a 
programming concept and practice with scripts developed to demonstrate the concept and 
not a specific published application.  Hansman and Hunt provide for such a case by 
allowing the use of Howard and Longstaff’s (1998) vulnerability in design classification 
which defines the design of the program as perfectly implemented but flawed. 
The fourth dimension addresses the attack payload which in this case is simply the 
capturing of the password.  The Hansman and Hunt category selected is Disclosure of 
Information. 
Dimension Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
One password attacks 
exploiting 
implementation     
Two software application server 
interpretive 
script 
Three 
vulnerability in 
design 
simple attack 
logic bomb attack 
debugger attack     
Four 
Disclosure of 
Information    
Table 1 Attack Classification Matrix 
Attack Vectors Employed 
The desired attack vector payload is to capture the credentials being used by the 
interpretive language scripts.  This was accomplished using two attack vector methods 
and four attacks under those methods.  The first method is a called a Man-At-The-End 
attack (MATE).  This type of attack is generally defined as an adversary gaining an 
advantage by violating the software  under their control (Collberg, 2011).  Tampering 
attacks and reverse-engineering attacks are the two most common forms of MATE 
attacks (Falcarin, Collberg, Atallah, & Jabubowski, 2011). 
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For the purposes of this research the MATE defined tampering attack was used in 
the first attack vector method.  The two MATE tampering attack vectors employed were 
a probe attack and a logic bomb attack.  A probe attack is one in which an adversary with 
privileged access examines and probes software looking for low hanging fruit such as 
embedded credentials within the code of the script (Falcarin et al., 2011).  There were 
two flavors of probe attack employed.  One used simple commands to examine the 
scripts, the second used a debugger to examine the code and it’s in memory variables 
during execution.  A logic bomb attack is an attack in which the code of the script is 
modified to relay the credentials to an adversary at run-time.  For this attack code was 
added to the script to pass the payload to standard output for capture. 
The second attack vector method that was used is a memory scan attack.  
Researchers have had quite a bit of success in retrieving encryption keys from active 
system memory.  Enck, Butler, Richardson, McDaniel and Smith (2008) found that in 
order for this attack vector to be successful the adversary must have physical privileged 
access to the machine on which the software is running as was the case in the research 
presented here.  However, this research differs from Enck, Butler, Richardson, McDaniel 
and Smith’s research in that the payload is not an encryption key, but a plaintext 
password.  Hargraves and Chivers (2008) report that several researchers have had great 
success in retrieving plaintext passwords using the same attack vector.  Bauer (2009) also 
reports on  the success of rootkits in scanning memory and gaining access the privileged 
information. 
The attacks that were used to evaluate the pre-and post-research exploitability of the 
test scripts are broken down below.  Each attack was performed using a privileged 
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account (‘root’ for Unix/Linux and ‘administrator’ for Windows).  The privileged 
account and commands used varied depending of the operating system.  The attacks were 
carried out against two scripts that performed a simple task; connect to an RDBMS and 
perform a simple query in a loop of 100 iterations and print the data returned.  One script 
utilized hard-coded credentials and the second utilized credentials returned from a 
password vault. 
(Vulnerability in design  simple attack) 
Simple operating system-specific commands were used on each operating system 
(Solaris, Linux and Windows) to capture the password.  Success of the attack was 
measured by the ability to capture the password and then by the degree of difficulty of a 
successful attack.  This test was performed on a script that used a hard-coded password 
and a script that requested a password from a password vault. 
The following commands were employed to extract the password from the scripts at 
rest: 
Windows 
• type – This command prints the contents of the script to standard output (the 
screen).  The script code was examined looking for occurrences of password 
embedding or calls to a password vault.  The examinations like this may 
yield additional areas to investigate such as other scripts that are called from 
the target script.  Example command: 
C:\Users\Gary> type perlscript.pl 
• find – This command searched the targeted script for occurrences of the 
specified token and printed them to standard output (the screen).  Variations 
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on the word ‘password’ were searched for in the script.  Example command: 
C:\Users\Gary> find :password: C:\Users\Gary\perlscript.pl 
Unix/Linux 
• cat – This command prints the contents of the script to standard output (the 
screen).  The script code was examined looking for occurrences of password 
embedding or calls to a password vault.  The examinations like this may 
yield additional areas to investigate such as other scripts that are called from 
the target script.  Example command: 
#: cat perlscript.pl 
• grep – This command searched the targeted script for occurrences of the 
supplied token and prints them to standard output (the screen).  Variations 
on the word ‘password’ were searched for in the script.  Example command: 
#: grep –i password perlscript.pl 
In the above example the –i option makes the search case insensitive. 
(Vulnerability in design  logic bomb attack) 
Logic was embedded in the script to capture and distribute the password during the 
execution of the script.  This test was performed on scripts that requested a password 
from a password vault.  The exact nature of the code that was added to the script 
depended on the code structure of the script itself.  Generally, passwords returned to a 
requesting script are stored in a localized variable for future use.  The contents of that 
variable were written to standard output.  Alternatively, the contents of the password 
variable can be sent to Standard Error or emailed out.  However, those are really 
alternative methods of distribution after the fact.  Therefore, writing the password to 
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Standard Out sufficed for this test.  Success of the attack was measured by the ability to 
capture the password, and then secondarily by the degree of difficulty in achieving the 
successful attack. 
The VI editor was used for this attack on all platforms.  On the windows platform 
the MKS VI editor version 8.5, build 1397 was used.  It is available from MKS, Inc. 
(www.mkssoftware.com).  On the Linux and Solaris platform the VI editor included with 
the release of the O/S was used. 
(Vulnerability in design  debugger attack) 
A process debugger was used to step through the execution of the script in an 
attempt to capture the password during script execution.  “Ptkdb is a free/open source 
debugger for Perl with graphical user interface (GUI) based on Perk/Tk.” (Page & 
Marinov, 2007)  Because it is specifically built for Perl, it is highly portable and able to 
run on Solaris, Linux and Windows 7.  Being able to use the same debugger across 
platforms allowed for a more consistent platform independent test scenario. 
This test used the Perl/Tk debugger, ptkdb version 1.231, to explore the script as it 
executed.  The entire execution of the script was manually stepped through and all 
internal and external variables were examined looking for the possible storage of a 
password.  At each step all sub-functions were stepped into and their variables examined.  
Drilling down continued until the lowest executing sub-function has been reached.  
Success of the attack was measured by the ability to capture the password and then by the 
degree of difficulty of a successful attack. 
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Figure 1 testScript.pl Function Exploration Example 
Windows 
•   The script was executed using the following syntax: 
C:\Strawberry\Perl\Bin> perl –d:ptkdb testScript.pl. 
 
Figure 2 Typical Windows ptkdb Session Window 
Unix/Linux 
•   The script was executed using the following syntax: 
#: perl –d:ptkdb testScript.pl. 
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Figure 3 Typical Solaris/Linux ptkdb Session Window 
(Vulnerability in design  memory dump attack) 
This attack attempted to extract the password from a dump of system memory 
during script execution.  Methods and commands used varied depending on the operating 
system the script was running on.  Success of the attack was measured by the ability to 
capture the password and then by the degree of difficulty of the successful attack.  The 
following steps were used for each operating system: 
Windows 
Several tools from different manufacturers were used in conjunction to generate and 
search a memory dump (see Appendix B).  The following commands will be used to 
create and explore the Windows memory dump: 
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• As administrator, using the Microsoft Sysinternals LiveKD kernel debugger, a 
memory dump of the system’s memory was generated during the execution of the 
targeted Perl Script.  The following syntax was used: 
0: KD> .dump –f C:\memory.dmp 
• The following is an example of a typical simple parsing of the memory dump 
searching for a ‘Password’ string: 
C:\> type memory.dmp | strings | grep –i ‘password = ‘ 
Unix/Linux 
The following commands were used to create and explore the Unix/Linux memory 
dump: 
• As root, using the standard Unix/Linux dd command, a memory dump of the 
system’s memory was generated during the execution of the targeted Perl Script.  
The following syntax will be used: 
# dd if=/dev/mem of=/memory.dmp 
• The following is an example of typical command syntax for a simple parsing of a 
memory dump searching for a ‘Password’ string: 
# cat /memory.dmp | strings | grep –i ‘password = ‘ 
Password Obfuscation Design Method 
Because Aspect code can be housed outside of the targeted program and called 
transparently during execution a higher level of obscurity can be achieved, further 
reducing the risk of memory scan attacks.  A higher level of obscurity, resulting in a 
lower level of risk, was achieved by implementing concerns that utilize the Composition 
Filter (CF) model.  The CF model is a modular extension to the conventional object-
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based model of which Perl subscribes.  Filters define enhancements to messages sent and 
received by objects (Filman, Elrad, Clarke, & Aksit, 2005). 
Consider a Perl script that calls a module that opens a connection to a remote data 
source such as an RDBMS.  The module received messages containing information 
needed to affect the desired end result, which is an established connection to the remote 
data source.  The credentials needed to authenticate the connection are generally passed 
to the called module from the calling script. 
Figure 4 Typical Database Connection Scenario 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the proposed filter and how the pointcut intercepts the 
connection credentials, makes the password vault request and subsequently modifies the 
message with the correct credentials before passing it on to the RDBMS connection 
module.  By enhancing the message in this manner a level of abstraction is introduced 
that obfuscates the handling of the credentials.  This is accomplished in part because the 
code for the aspect does not reside in the program code nor is it placed in the program 
codebase by the developers who wrote the program.  The Aspect will be located in the 
function library and loaded at program execution time. 
49 
 
At no time are the credentials returned to the program or handled in any manner by 
the script code that was created by the program creator.  Because there is no code in the 
script itself that touches the credentials the level of obfuscation is high and the risk of a 
successful attack is diminished greatly.  
Figure 5 Connection Process with Composition Filter Enhancement 
Baseline Attack Vector Payload 
The initial baseline demonstrates the exploitability of the credentials stored in the 
interactive scripts as well as those scripts that use the Cloakware Password Authority 
product.  The security and strength of the Cloakware product was not evaluated, as it was 
used simply as a transport for returning the password to the application.  These 
interpretive Perl scripts typify a common batch processing environment in which scripts 
run unattended, connect to a database server and perform standard database-related tasks 
such as selecting, inserting and deleting data from tables under database control.  Typical 
database servers require password authentication from accessing scripts.  Common to 
batch processing environments are a mix of computers with disparate operating systems.  
It is also significant to note that attack vectors vary with operating systems.  Therefore, 
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computers running Windows, Linux and Solaris were used to emulate a typical batch 
processing environment allowing a complete and robust test environment.  Vulnerability 
testing was conducted on all platforms and operating systems listed above.  All 
discovered vulnerabilities and exploits were fully documented and are reproducible. 
The Perl scripting language was chosen as the programing language for this 
research.  It is platform agnostic, and by far, the most popular interpretive scripting 
language in use today for batch processing and web scripting (Sheppard, 2000).  Several 
interpretive Perl scripts were developed that log into a database server and perform 
queries against several tables containing test data.  These were not elaborate or complex 
scripts, but ones that simply demonstrated a connection to a database server using an ID 
and password to authenticate in a manner most typical to client/server architecture based 
processing environments.  A commercial password vault product was used to store and 
return passwords to these programs.  The Password Authority product from Cloakware 
was used to house and return a password upon request.  Cloakware, a subsidiary of the 
Xceedium, Inc. was petitioned and has graciously granted this author a one year software 
license for their product use in this research (see Appendix A).   Cloakware agents were 
installed on all test machines to facilitate automated requesting and receipt of passwords. 
Two scripts were used for the creation of baseline testing.  Each script initialized a 
connection to a remote data source (RDBMS) and performed a simple database query.  
The first script had the connection credentials hardcoded into the script.  The second 
script is a bit more complex in that it did not have the credentials hardcoded into it, but 
relied on requesting the credentials from the password vault.  It then passed the 
credentials on to the connection module.  See Appendix C for a listing of each script. 
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Quantifying Testing Results 
As introduced in the “Dissertation Goal” section of Chapter 1, Kepner and Tregoe’s 
Weighted Decision Analysis Matrix theory was used to quantify the testing results and 
measure the delta between the baseline and post-research results.  The required matrix 
consists of an array presenting pre-and post-research tests on the vertical axis.  The 
horizontal axis represents a list of attacks that were performed against the test scripts 
attempting to mine the password used in the scripts.  Each Attack Vector was weighted 
(W) from one to ten to indicate the degree of difficulty as evaluated against all other 
exploits attempted.  The score or degree of success for each attack (S) was presented in 
the vector (xy coordinates) of the pre-or post-research test and the attack.  The weighted 
score (W x S) was calculated as the product of the attack weight and the degree of 
success of the attack (the score).  The rightmost column contains the sum of weighted 
scores for the pre-and post-research testing.  The delta between the total weighted score 
of the pre-and post-test results indicates the success or failure the method in reducing the 
risk of password exploit. 
 
Figure 6 Sample Risk Analysis Matrix 
 
Evaluation of the attack success (the score) was first be based on whether or not the 
attempt to capture the password was in fact successful.  A failed attack would 
automatically generate a score of zero.  A successful attack is defined as the capture of 
the password.  Once successful, an attack was then evaluated on the degree of difficulty 
Weight (W): 0 Weight (W): 0 Weight (W): 0 Weight (W): 0
(W x S) (W x S) (W x S) (W x S)
Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Risk Score
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Risk FactorTotals 0 0 0 0 0
Windows 7
Linux
Solaris 10
Research Risk Analysis Matrix
Aspect Modified
Probe Attack Logic Bomb Attack Debugger Attack Memory Scan Attack
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in capturing the password.  Each successful attack was evaluated on a scale of one to ten 
and then considered in determining the total score for that attack vector. 
Assessing the degree of difficulty of an attack (W) is a process of evaluating the 
degree of technical knowledge and expertise necessary to carry out the attack along with 
the effort necessary. (Hongyu, Hu, Huang, Wang, & Chen, 2011)  Byres, Franz, and 
Miller (2004) also point out that risk is an expression of the likelihood that a treat can 
exploit a payload, and that the likelihood of the attack success is directly related to the 
technical skill level of the attacker.  They break down attack difficulty into four levels; 
trivial, moderate, difficult and unlikely. 
Zaobin, Tang, Wu, and Varadharajan (2007) break down attack difficulty into a 
descending scale of five levels with level five being very hard, hard, moderate, easy and 
level one being very easy.  The Verizon Risk Team ("2012 Data Breach Investigations 
Report," 2012) investigators define four levels of attack difficulty as very low – no 
special skills needed, low - basic skills needed, moderate – skilled techniques required 
and high – advanced skills required. 
For the purposes of this research, attack difficulty (W) is defined as the required 
skill level of the attacker as influenced by the likelihood of the success of the attack.  The 
likelihood of attack success is directly correlated to the effort required of the attacker to 
achieve the payload.  For instance, a debugger attack requires a higher level of attacker 
skill than a memory scan attack.  However, the memory scan attack requires a much 
greater effort to achieve success than the debugger attack.  Because of the effort involved, 
the memory scan attack has a much lower return on investment than that of the debugger 
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attack.  Therefore, the debugger attack is deemed to have a lower degree of difficulty 
than the memory scan attack 
Ranking and rating the difficulty of attack arguably involves a degree of 
subjectivity ("2012 Data Breach Investigations Report," 2012).  Such was the case in 
determining the degree of attack difficulty for each of the four attacks considered in this 
research.  The degree of difficulty was assessed on two planes.  The first being the skill 
level required for the attack and second the effort involved in effecting the attack.  Each 
plane was rated on a scale of one to three, whereas one was the lowest and three the 
highest ranking.  Table two represents how the attack difficulty value for each attack was 
determined. 
 
  Skill Level Effort Difficulty 
(W) 
Probe Attack low low 10 
Logic Bomb Attack low moderately 
low 
9 
Debugger Attack moderate moderately 
low 
8 
Memory Scan Attack moderately 
low 
very high 4 
Table 2 Attack Difficulty Matrix 
Resource Requirements 
A small processing environment was setup that is representative of a typical 
client/server batch processing environment.  A networked environment was assembled 
consisting of two commercial relational database managers (RDBMS), a commercial 
password vault and a mix of computers that represent the three major batch processing 
operating systems; Linux, Solaris and Windows.  Xceedium’s Cloakware Password 
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Authority was chosen for use in this research.  Appendix A contains the formal request 
and permission to use the Cloakware product.  Appendix B contains a detailed list of 
hardware and software that was used and a network topography diagram. 
It should be noted that although not explicitly pertinent to the research, certain 
indirectly pertinent equipment is itemized in the list of resources.  Equipment such as 
UPS power equipment, NAS storage devices and a tape backup server are germane to 
protecting the research environment and allowing for restoration of critical work should 
something untoward happen such as a power outage, hardware failure or an accidental 
deletion of critical files. 
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Introduction 
In this chapter the results of the credential obfuscation research will be presented.  
The first part will describe the establishment of a risk level baseline against which the 
degree of success of the credential obfuscation method will be judged.  The baseline is 
presented in the form of a set of risk analysis matrices as described in chapter three.  
Throughout the rest of this work the initial activity will be referred to as ‘Baseline’ and 
the post baseline activity will be referred to as ‘Aspect Modified’.  It is appropriately 
named because the code lines used to form the baseline scores were modified to utilize an 
aspect as the foundation of the credentials obfuscation method. 
Attack vector baselines were established using two Perl scripts written specifically 
for this work and tested on three different platforms, Windows 7, Linux and Solaris 10.  
Each script established a connection to an RDBMS and performed a simple query in a 
loop of 100 iterations.  In most cases it was not necessary to run the script through all 100 
iterations to accomplish the targeted attack.  Scripts running on Windows 7 and Linux 
connected to a MySQL RDBMS and scripts running on Solaris connected to an Oracle 
RDMBS.  The only difference between scripts that were run on Windows and Linux and 
the scripts run on Solaris is name and IP address of the target RDBMS.  Otherwise all 
scripts and Perl modules are identical.  The brand of the target RDBMS was deemed 
insignificant to the work and research being performed and was chosen simply for ease of 
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use.  The method for connecting to the target RDBMS, the Perl DBI module, is germane 
to this work and was identical through all three platforms tested. 
The first script utilized hard-coded credentials to connect to the RDBMS.  The 
second script utilized credentials that were stored in a password vault and returned to the 
script via a subroutine called passwdLookup().  This subroutine wraps the password vault 
specific code into a single subroutine call.  The passwdLookup() subroutine is contained 
in the Perl module called NOVA::Passwd.pm.  It takes two arguments when called.  The 
first is the ID for which the password is required and the second is the name of the Server 
the ID will be used to connect to.  The two arguments are combined to form a single ID 
Alias and passed on to the password vault.  The use of an ID alias is unique to the brand 
of password vault used for this research.  Using the Perl module and the passwdLookup() 
subroutine allowed for the moving of redundant code from the test scripts to a library 
(Perl module).  A full code listing of all scripts can be found in Appendix C.  Wrapping 
the password vault product specific code in a Perl module is typical of the generally 
accepted method for using the Cloakware product from within a Perl script.  It is also 
essential to obfuscating the password retrieval method and aided in the creation of the 
aspect code in the second part of the research. 
Once baselines were established the Perl module was modified to include code that 
automatically invokes an aspect in which the pointcut handled the password vault call, 
the reception of the returned password and the opening of the application connection.  
This takes place in the advice woven into the application connection open function call at 
runtime.  The exact same attacks were carried out against the scripts using the aspect 
modified Perl module.  A second set of statistics was gathered and will be presented in 
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the form of a second set of risk analysis matrices.  Conclusions and analysis of success or 
failure will be drawn from the delta of the two sets of matrices. 
During the execution of the attacks, it was observed that the level of attack 
difficulty stayed static between platforms and did not vary.  The commands differed for 
each platform, but each attack vector, whether successful or not, met with an equal 
challenge on across platforms.  This did not change between the establishment of the 
baseline scores and the establishment of the aspect modified scores. 
Attack Vector Baselines 
It should be noted that all successful baseline attack vectors were given the highest 
score of ten points.  Attack vectors run against Aspect modified code were awarded 
scores based on the degree of difficulty in capturing the payload as compared to the 
baseline.  The baseline Risk Matrix was identical across all three platforms. 
 
Table 3 Baseline Risk Analysis Matrix for all platforms 
 
The probe attack vector was given a weight value of two as this is considered the 
easiest attack to carry out and required the least amount of skill.  The logic bomb attack 
vector was given a weight of three as it is marginally more difficult to carry out than the 
probe attack vector and required some minimal programming skills.  These two 
tampering attacks are considered most common forms of MATE attacks and therefore 
received the lowest weights (Falcarin et al., 2011). 
Weight (W): 2 Weight (W): 3 Weight (W): 4 Weight (W): 4
(W x S) (W x S) (W x S) (W x S)
Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Risk Score
Simple Script 10 20 10 30 10 40 10 40 130
Passwd Vault Script 2 4 10 30 10 40 10 40 114
Simple Script 10 20 10 30 10 40 10 40 130
Passwd Vault Script 2 4 10 30 10 40 10 40 114
Simple Script 10 20 10 30 10 40 10 40 130
Passwd Vault Script 2 4 10 30 10 40 10 40 114
 Risk FactorTotals 72 180 240 240 732
Debugger Attack Memory Scan Attack
Windows 7
Linux
Solaris 10
Research Risk Analysis Matrix
Baseline
Probe Attack Logic Bomb Attack
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Of the two remaining attack 
vectors the debugger attack vector and 
the memory scan attack vector were 
each weighted at four.  Although the 
skill set required to effect the debugger 
attack vector is much greater than that 
which is required for the memory scan 
attack vector, it required less effort to 
carry out and is considered more 
common by MATE standards (Falcarin 
et al., 2011).  The memory scan attack vector received a weight of four because it 
required much more effort to carry out than the debugger attack vector, but also required 
much less skill.  It is quite time consuming and requires a brute-force effort to test strings 
found in memory to see if they are in fact the targeted payload being searched for.  There 
is a very low return on investment for the effort in this kind of attack. 
Probe Attack Vector 
The first attack performed was a simple probe attack (Vulnerability in design  
simple attack).  It consisted of printing the targeted script to standard output.  To facilitate 
this, the ‘type’ command was used against the script with the hard-coded credentials on 
the Windows 7 platform and the ‘cat’ command was used on the Linux and Solaris 10 
platforms.  Screenshots of each exploit can be found in Appendix D.  A baseline score of 
ten indicating a successful attack was awarded to this attack vector when run against the 
script with hard-coded credentials. 
Table 4 Attack Vector Weight to Skill Level Comparison 
0
1
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3
4
Skill
Required
Effort
Required
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When the attack was run against the script utilizing the password vault for password 
storage no credentials were able to be captured.  However, the method for retrieving the 
password from the vault was easily discovered by the attacker during the attack.  Even 
though capturing the payload was not achieved, valuable information was gained that 
could aide attackers in developing an alternative plan to capture the payload.  A score of 
two was awarded for this attack because of the information gained during the attack.  
There was no variance between platforms for ease of execution or degree of difficulty in 
achieving success. 
Logic Bomb Attack Vector 
The second attack vector consisted of a logic bomb attack (Vulnerability in design 
 logic bomb attack).  Code was inserted into the script to print the credentials to 
standard output.  Screenshots of each exploit can be found in Appendix D.  A score of ten 
was awarded this attack vector when run against both of the scripts as capturing the 
payload was easily accomplished.  There was no variance between platforms for ease of 
execution or degree of difficulty in achieving success. 
Debugger Attack Vector 
The third attack vector (Vulnerability in design  debugger attack) utilized a 
debugger to capture the payload.  When run against the script with the hard-coded 
credentials the total time of attack was less than ten seconds as the password was 
displayed in the initial debugger screen without having to execution any commands.  
When run against the script that utilized the password vault a total time to payload 
capture was approximately 2 minutes average across all platforms and required a higher 
degree of skill than the probe and logic bomb attack vectors.  Screenshots of each exploit 
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can be found in Appendix D.  Simple debugger steps where used to accomplish the goal.  
The script was executed and stepped though one line of code at a time.  It was not 
necessary to step into any subroutines, declare any break points or use any complex 
debugger skills to achieve success. 
Memory Scan Attack Vector 
The fourth attack vector utilized a memory dump and subsequent scan to capture 
the payload.  It was observed that previous execution of the scripts seem to stay resident 
in the memory at the time of the dump.  This held true even after cold system reboots.  In 
order to accurately test attack vectors it was necessary to change the password used fairly 
often.  A second observation was that the memory dumps for the Windows 7 platform 
and the Linux platform where identical in structure, while the memory dump for the 
Solaris 10 platform was quite different.  The similarity of the Windows 7 and Linux 
memory dumps is most likely due to their both running same x86 based instruction set 
CPU architecture.  The Windows 7 machine ran on an Intel 2.76 GHz i7 CPU M620 and 
the Linux platform ran on a 2.10 GHz AMD Athlon 64 X2 4000 CPU.  The Solaris 10 
platform ran on a 1.34 GHz UltraSPARC IIIi CPU which is an entirely different chip 
instruction set CPU architecture. 
Searches for the string ‘$Passwd =’ on the Windows 7 and Linux memory dumps 
yielded immediate success when attacking script with hard-coded credentials.  When the 
same attack vector was run on the Solaris 10 platform the password was captured, but 
there were no easily identifiable characteristics associated with the password.  Therefore, 
on the Solaris 10 platform a lengthy brute-force method of testing strings to identify 
which one was the password would have had to have been performed.  This was similar 
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in manner to that which was necessary for attack vectors on all three platforms against 
the script utilizing the password vault. 
To put the brute-force identification method into proper perspective, the Windows 7 
platform had ~20 million strings to parse, the Linux platform had ~28 million strings to 
parse and the Solaris 10 platform had ~5 million strings to parse.  Curiously, all three 
platforms were configured for four GB of usable memory, yet the number of strings 
varied quite a bit.  This made it much more difficult to capture the payload when the 
attack vector was run against the script utilizing the password vault.  For the purposes of 
this research and because the password was known ahead of time, searches were 
performed looking for the known password and the brute-force method of identification 
was avoided.  This had no negative affect on the data collected nor did it affect the 
outcome of the testing.  Screenshots of memory scan attack vectors can be found in 
Appendix D.  This level of difficulty only supports the lower attack weight assigned to 
this attack vector. In the wild only the most skilled and patient attackers would be able to 
carry out such an undetected attack successfully. 
Findings 
To achieve the goal of this research several modifications were made to the test 
scripts and the associated Perl module used to establish the baseline statistics.  The first 
modification was to add the ‘use NOVA::Passwd;’ pragma to load the Perl module into 
the script with the hard-coded credentials when it was executed.  The initial thought was 
to remove the hard-coded credentials completely from the script after adding the pragma 
call.  However, the thinking changed during the testing of the script with the aspect firing.  
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A set of invalid hard-coded credentials were left in the script that served as an additional 
form of obfuscation, thus further masking the fact that an aspect is firing. 
Modifications were also made to the second script that used the password vault for 
credential management.  The password vault call code was removed and a set of hard-
coded credentials were added as a smokescreen.  When finished, both scripts were 
identical. 
Further changes were made to the Perl module.  A subroutine was added that fires 
off an aspect creating a filter.  The pointcut intercepted the connection credentials passed 
to the RDBMS connection call and made the appropriate password vault request 
subsequently modifying the message with the correct credentials before passing it on to 
the RDBMS connection module.  By enhancing the message in this manner a level of 
abstraction was successfully introduced that obfuscated the handling of the credentials. 
The following table shows an analysis of the attack vectors run against scripts using 
the aspect modified Perl module.  Each attack vector will be presented and analyzed in 
the following sections.  A comparison of the baseline and aspect modified results will be 
presented in the summary section of this chapter. 
 
Table 5 Aspect Modified Risk Analysis Matrix for all platforms 
Probe Attack Vector 
The probe attack vector presented the largest variances between baseline and aspect 
modified scores.  By utilizing an aspect to intercept the call to the DBI->connect 
Weight (W): 2 Weight (W): 3 Weight (W): 4 Weight (W): 4
(W x S) (W x S) (W x S) (W x S)
Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Score (S) Factor Risk Score
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
Simple Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
Passwd Vault Script 0 0 0 0 5 20 10 40 60
 Risk FactorTotals 0 0 120 240 360
Memory Scan Attack
Windows 7
Linux
Solaris 10
Research Risk Analysis Matrix
Aspect Modified
Probe Attack Logic Bomb Attack Debugger Attack
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subroutine and replace the supplied password with the real password the level of risk was 
reduced 100%.  All attempts to scan the script code to capture the password were 
unsuccessful. 
Simply converting the script to use the password vault thwarted the probe attack 
from capturing the payload.  However, using the aspect to retrieve the password allowed 
the script to present the setting of a fictitious password as a smokescreen and pass it as an 
argument to the DBI->connect subroutine.  This also further obscured the method of 
password retrieval from the attacker. 
 
Table 6 Probe Attack Risk Reduction Comparison 
Logic Bomb Attack Vector 
The logic bomb attack vector presented the largest variance between baseline and 
aspect modified scores.  By utilizing an aspect to intercept the call to the DBI->connect 
subroutine and replace the supplied password with the real password the level of risk was 
reduced 100%.  This attack vector modifies the script code to print out the hard-coded 
password, or in the case of the script retrieving the password from the password vault the 
returned password from the vault.   Only a simple edit on the script with the hard-coded 
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credentials to add the ‘use NOVA::Passwd;’ pragma was required to reduce the risk of 
attack by 100%. 
 
Table 7 Logic Bomb Attack Risk Reduction Comparison 
 
In addition to adding the ‘use NOVA::Passwd;’ pragma to the script that utilized 
the password vault, the code that made the password vault call was removed.  In its place 
the hard-coding of a password was added.  This gave the script a higher level obscurity 
masking the use of aspect to retrieve the credentials.  
Debugger Attack Vector 
The debugger attack vector successfully captured the payload in both the baseline 
tests and the aspect modified tests.  The level of difficulty and the skill required increased 
significantly when an aspect was introduced.  On average 50 plus debugger commands 
were needed to capture the payload when calling the aspect to return the password from 
the vault.  In comparison, no commands were needed for the hard-coded credentials 
script in the baseline test and three commands for the password vault baseline script. 
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Table 8 Debugger Attack Risk Reduction Comparison 
 
During the execution of the 50 plus debugger commands hundreds of lines of code 
required review and numerous subroutines had to be stepped into before the aspect code 
was discovered.  It was clear that prior knowledge of the code base aided the attack and 
mostly certainly reduced the steps involved in achieving success. 
Memory Scan Attack Vector 
Both the baseline and the aspect modified attack vectors stayed fairly static in their 
level of difficulty and their successful outcome.  An attacker would need a significant 
amount of time and the ability to test multiple candidate strings recovered from the dump 
against the target RDBMS before finding the payload.  It was observed that the use of 
passwords with lower levels of complexity was more easily captured than if the password 
had a high level of complexity.  Passwords made up of 12 to 16 characters in length 
utilizing uppercase, lowercase letters, numbers and punctuation characters significantly 
increased the level of difficulty in capturing the payload. 
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Capturing the payload was not impossible even with complex passwords, but highly 
impractical considering most locked down and secure RDBMS’s would have login 
failure monitoring in place to trap multiple failures from a single source.  Given time and 
the proper environment the payload can and would be captured.  The significant point 
here is that this attack vector was unaffected by the use of the aspect methodology 
proposed in the research. 
 
Table 9 Memory Scan Attack Risk Reduction Comparison 
Summary of Results 
Invoking an Aspect, whose code can be housed outside of the targeted program and 
called transparently during execution, significantly reduced the risk from attack.  Overall, 
this research was able to effect a 50.82% reduction in risk as measured across all attack 
vectors.  It was noted that changes in risk levels did not vary between platforms, but were 
surprisingly identical.  Basically, the operating made no difference and had no impact on 
the success or failure of the attack vector.  Baseline risk scores of 244 per platform were 
recorded prior to the introduction of the aspect method and then reduced to risk scores of 
120 once an aspect method was introduced, thus supporting and proving that the 
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obfuscation of the application to application connection credentials does in fact 
significantly reduce risk from attack.   The graph in Table 10 demonstrates the levels of 
risk comparatively. 
 
Table 10 Comparative Levels of Risk 
 
It was observed that a higher level of risk reduction was achieved in attack vectors 
that required lower levels of skill to effect.  Conversely, those attack vectors requiring 
high skill levels saw little or no reduction in risk.  A 100% reduction in risk for the probe 
and logic bomb attack vectors was achieved, while the debugger attack vector achieved a 
50% reduction in risk.  The memory scan attack vector saw no reduction in risk at all.  
This is in agreement with the higher skill level required for the attack. 
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Table 11 Reduction of Risk across Attack Vectors 
 
Introducing an aspect achieved a higher level of obscurity, resulting in a lower level 
of risk, by implementing concerns that utilized the Composition Filter (CF) model.  
Obfuscation of the program code and its variables proved to be impossible once stored in 
system memory.  The use of a debugger to examine program code during execution 
required a higher skill level and the proposed aspect method significantly obstructed the 
path to the variables, but was not able to block the attack from gaining the payload. 
 
Table 12 Comparative analysis of skill level to attack success 
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Table 12 demonstrates a comparative analysis of baseline to aspect modified attack 
vectors as influenced by the skill level of the attack.  As the skill level rises, the ability of 
the aspect method to reduce risk drops. 
Considering the two attack methods used in this research, the MATE attack method 
is by far the more widely used one by attackers (Falcarin et al., 2011), far more so than 
the memory scan attack method.  Further, if one considers only the MATE attack vectors, 
the Aspect Obfuscation Method reduced risk by 75.61%.  Therefore, it can be said 
without a shadow of doubt that the stated goal of this research has been achieved. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
Analysis of research efforts, auditing and regulatory agency standards and third 
party products tell us that most people knowledgeable in the field have conceded that the 
challenge of protecting application-to-application credentials used in interpretive scripts 
is unsolvable (Chinchani et al., 2005; Chumash & Yao, 2009; Shiflett, 2004; Shmueli et 
al., 2010; Yu et al., 2009).  While the research presented in this work does not claim to 
eliminate all risk of attack against application-to-application credentials it has proven that 
the risk can be reduced significantly. 
We are told that 17% of all insider attacks are perpetrated by attackers with 
privileged access (Randazzo et al., 2005).  The majority of those attackers do not possess 
advance programing or forensic analysis skills.  They are more crimes of opportunity 
than not.  Yet, very little literature or research has been dedicated to reducing the risk of 
attacks on application-to-application credentials contained in programs accessible by 
those attackers.  Instead, the focus of auditing and regulatory agencies and third party 
product researchers has been on mitigating the impact of successful attacks (Franqueira et 
al., 2010).  This author feels, and this dissertation proves out, that the effort would be 
better spent preventing the attack altogether. 
It has long been said that skilled thieves are unstoppable and most locks were 
designed to keep out honest people and the lessor skilled thieves.  The work presented 
here has proven that it is possible to block attack vectors from attackers with lessor 
71 
 
forensic skills and retard attacks from those with medium level skill sets.  The 
development of a framework to obfuscate application-to-application credentials used by 
interpretive Perl scripts is essential to raising the skill level necessary to successfully 
carry out an attack.  Raising the necessary skill level for successful attack vector directly 
lowers the risk of exploit. 
The key to reducing the risk of any attack is to reduce the attack surface.  The 
research presented here did just that.  When credentials are handled by the main body of 
program code, whether those credentials are hard-coded or returned from a password 
vault, they are exposed to attack from users with high levels of privilege on many planes.  
Figure 7 illustrates that by removing the handling of the credentials from the main body 
of code and relocating them to a secure library (the red circle) the attack surface is 
significantly reduced. 
 
Figure 7 Reducing the attack surface 
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The framework developed in this work has been able to reduce the risk of MATE 
attacks by as much as 75.61%.  It did, however, fail to reduce the risk from attacks 
perpetrated by highly skill attackers using a ‘low return on investment’ memory scan 
attack vector.  The framework developed in this research was able to effectively reduce 
low skill MATE attack vectors such as probe attacks and logic bomb attack by 100%.  
The third MATE attack vector explored, the debugger attack vector, had its risk reduced 
by 50%.  This overwhelmingly demonstrates the value of this framework in protecting 
application-to-application credentials from exploit. 
Implications 
This dissertation has made a number of contributions to the body of knowledge 
regarding the protection and handling of application-to-application credentials in 
interpretive scripts.  Most notable is moving the focus of security from post-attack 
mitigation to pre-attack preventive concepts.  Post-attack concepts deal with minimizing 
the impact and reducing loss from attack, whereas pre-attack concepts focus on attack 
avoidance and risk reduction. 
The framework developed from this research consists of the following 
recommendations: 
• Implement a secure password vault to manage all application-to-application 
credentials. 
• Wrap the password vault product specific code to retrieve those credentials 
from the vault in a subroutine stored in a secure library or Perl module.  The 
location of which must be secured and monitored real-time. 
73 
 
• Distract the attacker by planting incorrect hard-coded credentials in the 
script that for all intents and purposes would look like the normal 
connection credentials needed to establish the connection.  These false 
credentials could also be used as a honey pot to identify attacks in progress 
and possibly expose the identity of the attacker. 
• Invoke an aspect to intercept the subroutine call that establishes the 
connection to the remote data source from the interpretive script.  The aspect 
will then handle the password vault retrieval logic and replace the supplied 
credentials with the correct legitimate credentials needed for the connection.  
It is imperative that the aspect code be housed a library or Perl module, the 
location of which must be secured.  Looking at the code the attacker should 
not be able to determine that an aspect is being fired off. 
Securing application-to-application credentials in interpretive scripts can and will 
reduce financial impact of successful abuse of privilege attacks.  Instead of concentrating 
on limiting financial loss by focusing on post-attack security; organizations can now 
focus more on attack avoidance and risk reduction. 
Recommendations 
This dissertation is the first known to study the impact on risk reduction through the 
utilization of an aspect to obfuscate application-to-application credentials in a program 
written in an interpretive scripting language.  Aspects have long been used for such 
useful things as statistics gathering, measuring the number of subroutine calls, analyzing 
time spent in a subroutine and other crosscutting concerns that span subroutines within a 
program.  A framework addressing the concern of protecting application-to-application 
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credentials, be it crosscutting or not, provides a unique use of aspect technology in 
protecting those credentials. 
Several patent applications mentioned in this research have attempted to move the 
interception of application-to-application credentials into the network handling logic of 
the operating system.  For obvious reasons already mentioned this approach this is not a 
good idea.  However, additional research could and should be initiated into interfacing 
the fired-off aspect directly with the operating system to further lock down the credentials 
in transit from the vault. 
Additional studies could and should be initiated that explore the locking down and 
obfuscating of variables containing credentials in memory.  In the last year numerous 
papers have presented methods and approaches attempting to secure memory through 
encryption.  The work presented by Muller, Freiling, and Dewald (2011) shows promise 
but does not mesh well with the operating system and causes some issues.  Their future 
work is to focus on developing a special key register resident in the CPU.  They further 
hope to create a third party application that can perform the function on a Windows 
operating system. 
Chhabra, Rogers, Solihin, and Prvulovic (2011) present a hardware and software 
approach to full system security.  Their SecureME solution performs a process that they 
call memory cloaking.  This is quite promising as it allows for the contents of memory 
locations to be hidden from the OS while the OS is allowed to perform regular memory 
management functions.  The negative impact of their solution is that it could take as 
much as 13.5% of the system compute resources.  If they can refine this process to have 
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less of an impact on the operating system it would be an ideal complement for credential 
obfuscation via an aspect. 
Chhabra and Solihin (2011) present a simple memory encryption solution that is 
aimed at encrypting memory at the time of system shutdown.  This prevents memory 
scan attacks on non-volatile memory on systems that are at rest and not running.  Their 
approach has tremendous merit and warrants further exploration to see if it is feasible to 
implement full-time on a running system.  Enck et al. (2008) present a similar solution to 
Chhabra and Solihin, but it also only addresses non-volatile memory.  Because memory 
scan attacks proved successful even with the use of an aspect it is important for future 
research efforts to focus on and investigate methods to close this gap in security. 
Summary 
Government regulatory agencies and auditing standards bodies tell us we must 
never hard-code application-to-application credentials in our scripts.  They offer 
segregation of duties and the use of password vaults as the answer.  These agencies also 
require the implementation of strict guidelines for handling the inevitable data breaches.  
Researchers conclude there is no way to stop these breaches, universities do not go far 
enough in considering security concepts in their programming curriculum and 
programmers more often than not have no concept of what good secure programming 
methods are. 
Password vault vendors tout their products as a way to address the insecurity of 
application-to-application credentials in interpretive scripts.  When pressed they 
reluctantly admit that they have no control on what the script does with the credentials 
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once they are returned to the calling script.  It is no wonder that the number of successful 
insider attacks coming from attackers with privilege access is so high. 
The method and framework developed in this dissertation relocates the password 
retrieval code from the main body of program code, which is under the control of the 
programmer and accessible by the administrator, to the security of a centralized library 
module.  By obfuscating the handling of the credentials the administrator and the 
programmer lose their ability to access those credentials.  Without ready access to the 
credentials only the most skilled attackers can capture the attack vector payload. 
The goal of this dissertation was to prove that the firing of an aspect and the 
relocation of password retrieval code from the main body of the program could 
significantly reduce the risk of attack.  This concept was proven as a 50.82% overall 
reduction of risk was achieved.  A 75.61% reduction was achieved for attack vectors 
dealing directly with program code.  Lastly, this dissertation presented the foundation for 
secure programming methods that can be carried forward and enhanced with future 
research.  
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Appendix A 
Request for Cloakware License 
Figure 8 Cloakware License Request Email 
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Figure 9 Cloakware License Use Approval 
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Appendix B 
Hardware Inventory 
The following computer equipment will be required to complete this research. 
1. Backup Server 
a. HP Compaq 8200 SFF PC 
i. 1 x Quad Core  3.30 GHz Intel i3-2120 CPU 
ii. 12 GB memory 
iii. 500 GB internal hard drive 
iv. Windows 7 Professional 64 bit 
v. Roxio Retrospect V7.7 Backup Software 
vi. HP LT03 Tape Drive 
vii. Quantum DLT Tape Drive 
2. Client Servers 
a. Windows 7 
i. HP Elitebook 8440 Notebook PC 
1. 1 x Quad Core Intel 2.76 GHz  i7 CPU M620 
2. 4 GB memory 
3. 295 GB internal hard drive 
4. Windows 7 Professional 64 bit 
5. Strawberry Perl version 5.10.1.5 
6. The following base software was installed to facilitate 
the dumping of live memory: 
a. Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 lC64 
Redistributable, version 10.0.30319 
b. Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 x86 
Redistributable, version 10.0.30319 
c. Microsoft Windows Performance Toolkit, 
version 4.8.0 
d. Debugging Tools for Windows (x64), version 
612.2.633 
e. Microsoft .NET Framework4 Multi-Targeting 
Pack, version 4.0.3031g 
f. Application Verifier (lx64), version 4l1078 
g. Microsoft Visual C++ Compilers 2010 
Standard - enu - x64, version 10.0.30319 
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h. Microsoft Visual C++ Compilers 2010 
Standard - enu - x86, version10.0.30319 
i. Microsoft Windows SDK for Windows 7 
(7.1), version 71.7600.0.30514 
j. Microsoft Help Viewer 1.0, version 1.0.30319 
k. Microsoft .NET Framework 4 Extended, 
version 4.0.30319 
l. Microsoft Sysinternals Suite, version 02.24.11 
m. MKStool Kit, version 8 
b. Solaris 10 
i. Oracle/Sun SunFire V210 
1. 1 x 1.34 GHz UltraSPARC IIIi CPU  
2. 4 GB memory 
3. 2 x 146gb disk mirrored 
4. Solaris 10 
5. Oracle Database 11g, version 11.2.0.3 
6. Oracle Client 10g, 10.2.0.2 
7. Perl 5.10.0 
8. Cloakware Password Authority version 4.5.0 
c. openSUSE Linux 
i. Dell Inspiron 531 
1. 1 x 2.10 GHz AMD Athlon 64 X2 4000 CPU  
2. 4 GB Memory 
3. 250 GB hard drive 
4. openSUSE Linux version 10.3 
5. Perl 5.10.0 
3. Storage 
a. Western Digital ShareSpace 4TB NAS Storage Device 
4. Network Equipment 
a. Sonicwall TZ 100 Network Security Appliance providing DHCP 
services to the LAN and WLAN. 
b. 3 x Netgear GS608 8 Port Gigabit Desktop Switches 
5. Power Equipment 
a. 1 x APC SmartUPS 3000 
b. 1 x APC  Back-UPS X5 1500 
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Figure 10 Network Configuration Diagram 
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Appendix C 
Perl Scripts 
Baseline Scripts Used for Probe, Debugger and the Memory Scan Attacks 
Simple Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux 
This is a basic Perl script that has hard-coded application to application credentials.  
It connects to a MySql database server and performs a simple query in a loop of 100 
iterations. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
 
$User = 'gary'; 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:database=Nova;host=Linux-01", $User, 
$Passwd); 
die("Cannot open MySql Connection") if(!$dbh); 
 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
 SELECT col1, col2 
 FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
 print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
 $sth->execute(); 
 while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
  print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
 } 
 $sth->finish(); 
 sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
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Simple Script Used on Solaris 10 
This is a basic Perl script that has hard-coded application to application credentials.  
It connects to an Oracle database server and performs a simple query in a loop of 100 
iterations. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:Oracle:ORPCLK01", "gary", $Passwd); 
die("Cannot open Oracle Connection") if(!$dbh); 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
   SELECT col1, col2 
   FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
        print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
        $sth->execute(); 
        while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
                print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
        } 
        $sth->finish(); 
        sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
 
Password Vault Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux 
This is a essentially the same Perl script described above under “Simple Script Used 
on Windows 7 and Linux” except the hard-coded application to application credentials 
have been replaced with a call to a subroutine contained in the NOVA::Passwd Perl 
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module.  The new code is highlighted in red below.  It connects to a MySql database 
server and performs a simple query in a loop of 100 iterations. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
unless($Password = passwdLookup("gary","Linux-01")){ 
 die "Unable to retrieve password from Cloakware.\n"; 
} 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:database=Nova;host=Linux-01", "gary", 
$Password); 
die("Cannot open MySql Connection") if(!$dbh); 
 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
 SELECT col1, col2 
 FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
 print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
 $sth->execute(); 
 while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
  print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
 } 
 $sth->finish(); 
 sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
Password Vault Script Used on Solaris 10 
This is a essentially the same Perl script described above (Simple Script Used on 
Solaris 10) except the hard-coded application to application credentials have been 
replaced with a call to a subroutine contained in the NOVA::Passwd Perl module.  The 
new code is highlighted in red below.  It connects to a Oracle database server and 
performs a simple query in a loop of 100 iterations. 
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#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
unless($Password = passwdLookup("gary","ORPCLK01")){ 
        die "Unable to retrieve password from Cloakware.\n"; 
} 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:Oracle:ORPCLK01", "gary", $Password); 
die("Cannot open Oracle Connection") if(!$dbh); 
 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
        SELECT  col1, col2 
        FROM    novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
        print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
        $sth->execute(); 
        while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
                print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
        } 
        $sth->finish(); 
        sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
Perl Module Used for Password Vault Access on Windows 7 
The following is to code for a Perl module that houses a subroutine 
(passwdLookup) that performs a call the Cloakware Password Vault.  The subroutine 
expects two arguments to be passed to it.  The first is the ID for which the password is 
being requested. The second is the name of the server being connected to.  These two 
arguments are then combined into a singled string separated by an underscore to form an 
alias for the ID. The Cloakware Password Vault requires an alias to be passed to it for all 
password vault requests. 
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package NOVA::Passwd; 
 
our $VERSION = qw ($Revision: 1.0 $)[1]; 
use vars qw(@ISA @EXPORT); 
use Exporter; 
 
use lib "C:/cspm/cloakware/cspmclient/lib"; 
use CSPM_CLIENT; 
use Carp; 
 
@ISA = qw(Exporter); 
@EXPORT = qw(passwdLookup); 
 
sub passwdLookup{ 
        my $cwID = shift; 
        my $cwTarget = shift; 
 
        my $errorCode = { 
                400 => "Errorcode 400:Success", 
                401 => "Errorcode 401: Failed to authenticate with the “. 
                       “Password Authority service.", 
                402 => "Errorcode 402: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “client daemon.", 
                403 => "Errorcode 403: Not authorized (for client daemon).", 
                404 => "Errorcode 404: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “Password Authority Server.", 
                405 => "Errorcode 405: No data found for specified target “. 
                        “alias.", 
                406 => "Errorcode 406: Application error. See system log for “. 
                       “details.", 
                407 => "Errorcode 407: Invalid parameters specified.", 
                408 => "Errorcode 408: A system error occurred, problem with “. 
                       “the “. 
                       “client environment. Unable to retrieve environment “. 
                        “data.", 
                409 => "Errorcode 409: Unauthorized script name.", 
                410 => "Errorcode 410: Unauthorized execution path.", 
                411 => "Errorcode 411: Unauthorized execution user ID.", 
                412 => "Errorcode 412: Unauthorized request server.", 
                413 => "Errorcode 413: Client software version is “. 
                       “incompatible “. 
                       “with the server. ". 
                        "This version is no longer supported: upgrade the “. 
                        “Password Authority client software.", 
                414 => "Errorcode 414: DLL cannot locate exe. (Windows only)", 
                415 => "Errorcode 415: DLL internal error occurred. (Windows “. 
                       “only)", 
                419 => "Errorcode 419: Invalid target alias specified.", 
                441 => "Errorcode 441: Invalid file path specified.", 
                443 => "Errorcode 443: Client is initializing.", 
                445 => "Errorcode 445: Client is updating the encryption key.", 
                446 => "Errorcode 446: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid execution path specified for request script.", 
                447 => "Errorcode 447: Authorization mapping validation “ 
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                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid file path specified for request script.", 
                448 => "Errorcode 448: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing request script information.", 
                449 => "Errorcode 449: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing hash value for request script." 
        }; 
 
        if(!defined $cwID or !defined $cwTarget){ 
                return; 
        }else{ 
                my $cwAlias = $cwID . "_" . $cwTarget; 
                my ($cwAnswer, $cwCommand, @cwArray); 
 
                $cwCommand = qq{$GETCR $cwAlias true}; 
                $cwAnswer = `$cwCommand`; 
                @cwArray = split(/\s+/, $cwAnswer); 
                if($cwArray[0] ne "400"){ 
                        carp $errorCode->{$cwArray[0]}; 
                        return(undef); 
                }else{ 
                        return($cwArray[2]); 
                } 
        } 
} 
1: 
 
 
 
Perl Module Used for Password Vault Access on Linux and Solaris 10 
This is essentially the same Perl module described in “Perl Module Used for 
Password Vault Access on Windows 7” above with the exception of the Cloakware 
library location and the addition of the environment variables both highlighted in red 
below. 
package NOVA::Passwd; 
 
our $VERSION = qw ($Revision: 1.0 $)[1]; 
use vars qw(@ISA @EXPORT); 
use Exporter; 
 
use lib "/opt/cloakware/cspmclient/lib"; 
use CSPM_CLIENT; 
use Carp; 
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@ISA = qw(Exporter); 
@EXPORT = qw(passwdLookup); 
 
$ENV{'CSPM_CLIENT_HOME'} = "/opt/cloakware"; 
$ENV{'LD_LIBRARY_PATH'} = "/opt/cloakware/cspmclient/lib:”. 
                          “/opt/cloakware/cspmclient_thirdparty/java/bin"; 
$ENV{'CSPM_CLIENT_BIT_TYPE'} = "64"; 
 
sub passwdLookup{ 
        my $cwID = shift; 
        my $cwTarget = shift; 
 
        my $errorCode = { 
                400 => "Errorcode 400:Success", 
                401 => "Errorcode 401: Failed to authenticate with the “. 
                       “Password Authority service.", 
                402 => "Errorcode 402: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “client daemon.", 
                403 => "Errorcode 403: Not authorized (for client daemon).", 
                404 => "Errorcode 404: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “Password Authority Server.", 
                405 => "Errorcode 405: No data found for specified target “. 
                        “alias.", 
                406 => "Errorcode 406: Application error. See system log for “. 
                       “details.", 
                407 => "Errorcode 407: Invalid parameters specified.", 
                408 => "Errorcode 408: A system error occurred, problem with “. 
                       “the “. 
                       “client environment. Unable to retrieve environment “. 
                        “data.", 
                409 => "Errorcode 409: Unauthorized script name.", 
                410 => "Errorcode 410: Unauthorized execution path.", 
                411 => "Errorcode 411: Unauthorized execution user ID.", 
                412 => "Errorcode 412: Unauthorized request server.", 
                413 => "Errorcode 413: Client software version is “. 
                       “incompatible “. 
                       “with the server. ". 
                        "This version is no longer supported: upgrade the “. 
                        “Password Authority client software.", 
                414 => "Errorcode 414: DLL cannot locate exe. (Windows only)", 
                415 => "Errorcode 415: DLL internal error occurred. (Windows “. 
                       “only)", 
                419 => "Errorcode 419: Invalid target alias specified.", 
                441 => "Errorcode 441: Invalid file path specified.", 
                443 => "Errorcode 443: Client is initializing.", 
                445 => "Errorcode 445: Client is updating the encryption key.", 
                446 => "Errorcode 446: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid execution path specified for request script.", 
                447 => "Errorcode 447: Authorization mapping validation “ 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid file path specified for request script.", 
                448 => "Errorcode 448: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing request script information.", 
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                449 => "Errorcode 449: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing hash value for request script." 
                       “Missing hash value for request script." 
        }; 
 
        if(!defined $cwID or !defined $cwTarget){ 
                return; 
        }else{ 
                my $cwAlias = $cwID . "_" . $cwTarget; 
                my ($cwAnswer, $cwCommand, @cwArray); 
 
                $cwCommand = qq{$GETCR $cwAlias true}; 
                $cwAnswer = `$cwCommand`; 
                @cwArray = split(/\s+/, $cwAnswer); 
                if($cwArray[0] ne "400"){ 
                        carp $errorCode->{$cwArray[0]}; 
                        return(undef); 
                }else{ 
                        return($cwArray[2]); 
                } 
        } 
} 
1: 
 
Baseline Scripts Used for Logic Bomb Attack 
Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux 
The logic bomb attack consists of the addition of specific code to compromise the 
credentials contained or handled within the script.  The script described under “Simple 
Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux” was modified to print the credentials to standard 
out.  The code that was added to the script is highlighted below in red. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
 
$User = 'gary'; 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:database=Nova;host=Linux-01", $User, 
$Passwd); 
die("Cannot open MySql Connection") if(!$dbh); 
# 
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# Added logic bomb to print the password 
# 
print "$Passwd\n"; 
# 
# End logic bomb code 
# 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
 SELECT col1, col2 
 FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
 print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
 $sth->execute(); 
 while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
  print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
 } 
 $sth->finish(); 
 sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
Script Used on Solaris 10 
The logic bomb attack consists of the addition of specific code to compromise the 
credentials contained or handled within the script.  The script described under “Simple 
Script Used on Solaris 10” was modified to print the credentials to standard out.  The 
code that was added to the script is highlighted below in red. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:Oracle:ORPCLK01", "gary", $Passwd); 
die("Cannot open Oracle Connection") if(!$dbh); 
# 
# Added logic bomb to print the password 
# 
print "$Passwd\n"; 
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# 
# End logic bomb code 
# 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
  SELECT col1, col2 
FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
        print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
        $sth->execute(); 
        while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
                print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
        } 
        $sth->finish(); 
        sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
Aspect Modified Scripts Used for Probe, Debugger and the Memory Scan 
Attacks 
Simple Password Vault Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux 
This basic Perl script that has hard-coded application to application credentials was 
left as is except for the pragma call added to invoke the aspect shown in red below.    The 
call to DBI->connect is intercepted and the password parameter replaced with a password 
retrieved from the vault.  It connects to a MySql database server and performs a simple 
query in a loop of 100 iterations. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
$User = 'gary'; 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
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my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:database=Nova;host=Linux-01", $User, 
$Passwd); 
die("Cannot open MySql Connection") if(!$dbh); 
 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
 SELECT col1, col2 
 FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
 print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
 $sth->execute(); 
 while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
  print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
 } 
 $sth->finish(); 
 sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
 
Simple Password vault Script Used on Solaris 10 
This is basic Perl script that has hard-coded application to application credentials 
left as is except for the pragma call added to invoke the aspect shown in red below.  It 
connects to a Oracle database server and performs a simple query in a loop of 100 
iterations. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:Oracle:ORPCLK01", "gary", $Passwd); 
die("Cannot open Oracle Connection") if(!$dbh); 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
  SELECT col1, col2 
FROM novatab 
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"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
        print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
        $sth->execute(); 
        while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
                print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
        } 
        $sth->finish(); 
        sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
 
Aspect Modified Perl Module Used for Password Vault Access on 
Windows 7 
The following is to code for a Perl module that houses two subroutines that perform 
calls the Cloakware Password Vault.  The subroutine lookupPaswd() expects two 
arguments to be passed to it.  The first is the ID for which the password is being 
requested. The second is the name of the server being connected to.  These two 
arguments are then combined into a singled string separated by an underscore to form an 
alias for the ID. The Cloakware Password Vault requires an alias to be passed to it for all 
password vault requests. 
The second subroutine, passwdAspect() invokes an aspect to intercept calls to the 
DBI->connect subroutine and replaces the supplied password with one retrieved from the 
password vault.  The aspect is invoke automatically when the Perl module is loaded at 
execution time. 
package NOVA::Passwd; 
 
our $VERSION = qw ($Revision: 1.0 $)[1]; 
use vars qw(@ISA @EXPORT); 
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use Exporter; 
 
use lib "C:/cspm/cloakware/cspmclient/lib"; 
use CSPM_CLIENT; 
use Carp; 
 
@ISA = qw(Exporter); 
@EXPORT = qw(passwdLookup passwdAspect); 
 
sub passwdLookup{ 
        my $cwID = shift; 
        my $cwTarget = shift; 
 
        my $errorCode = { 
                400 => "Errorcode 400:Success", 
                401 => "Errorcode 401: Failed to authenticate with the “. 
                       “Password Authority service.", 
                402 => "Errorcode 402: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “client daemon.", 
                403 => "Errorcode 403: Not authorized (for client daemon).", 
                404 => "Errorcode 404: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “Password Authority Server.", 
                405 => "Errorcode 405: No data found for specified target “. 
                        “alias.", 
                406 => "Errorcode 406: Application error. See system log for “. 
                       “details.", 
                407 => "Errorcode 407: Invalid parameters specified.", 
                408 => "Errorcode 408: A system error occurred, problem with “. 
                       “the “. 
                       “client environment. Unable to retrieve environment “. 
                        “data.", 
                409 => "Errorcode 409: Unauthorized script name.", 
                410 => "Errorcode 410: Unauthorized execution path.", 
                411 => "Errorcode 411: Unauthorized execution user ID.", 
                412 => "Errorcode 412: Unauthorized request server.", 
                413 => "Errorcode 413: Client software version is “. 
                       “incompatible “. 
                       “with the server. ". 
                        "This version is no longer supported: upgrade the “. 
                        “Password Authority client software.", 
                414 => "Errorcode 414: DLL cannot locate exe. (Windows only)", 
                415 => "Errorcode 415: DLL internal error occurred. (Windows “. 
                       “only)", 
                419 => "Errorcode 419: Invalid target alias specified.", 
                441 => "Errorcode 441: Invalid file path specified.", 
                443 => "Errorcode 443: Client is initializing.", 
                445 => "Errorcode 445: Client is updating the encryption key.", 
                446 => "Errorcode 446: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid execution path specified for request script.", 
                447 => "Errorcode 447: Authorization mapping validation “ 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid file path specified for request script.", 
                448 => "Errorcode 448: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
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                       “Missing request script information.", 
                449 => "Errorcode 449: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing hash value for request script." 
        }; 
 
        if(!defined $cwID or !defined $cwTarget){ 
                return; 
        }else{ 
                my $cwAlias = $cwID . "_" . $cwTarget; 
                my ($cwAnswer, $cwCommand, @cwArray); 
 
                $cwCommand = qq{$GETCR $cwAlias true}; 
                $cwAnswer = `$cwCommand`; 
                @cwArray = split(/\s+/, $cwAnswer); 
                if($cwArray[0] ne "400"){ 
                        carp $errorCode->{$cwArray[0]}; 
                        return(undef); 
                }else{ 
                        return($cwArray[2]); 
                } 
        } 
} 
 
sub passwdAspect{ 
        before { 
                my $context = shift; 
                my ($cwTagert, $cwID, $cwPasswd); 
 
                my @params = $context->params; 
                $cwTarget = $params[1]; 
                $cwTarget =~ s/^.*=//; 
                $cwID = $params[2]; 
                unless($params[3] = passwdLookup($cwID,$cwTarget)){ 
                        print STDERR "\nThe passwd $cwID not found in 
Cloakware,”. 
                        “switching to passthrough mode\n"; 
                }else{ 
                        $context->params($params[0],$params[1],$params[2], 
                                  $params[3]); 
                } 
        } call ('DBI::connect'); 
} 
 
passwdAspect; 
1: 
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Aspect Modified Perl Module Used for Password Vault Access on Linux 
and Solaris 10 
This is essentially the same Perl module described in “Aspect Modified Perl 
Module Used for Password Vault Access on Windows 7” above with the exception of the 
Cloakware library location and the addition of the environment variables both highlighted 
in red below. 
package NOVA::Passwd; 
 
our $VERSION = qw ($Revision: 1.0 $)[1]; 
use vars qw(@ISA @EXPORT); 
use Exporter; 
 
use lib "/opt/cloakware/cspmclient/lib"; 
use CSPM_CLIENT; 
use Carp; 
 
@ISA = qw(Exporter); 
@EXPORT = qw(passwdLookup passwdAspect); 
 
$ENV{'CSPM_CLIENT_HOME'} = "/opt/cloakware"; 
$ENV{'LD_LIBRARY_PATH'} = "/opt/cloakware/cspmclient/lib:”. 
                          “/opt/cloakware/cspmclient_thirdparty/java/bin"; 
$ENV{'CSPM_CLIENT_BIT_TYPE'} = "64"; 
 
sub passwdLookup{ 
        my $cwID = shift; 
        my $cwTarget = shift; 
 
        my $errorCode = { 
                400 => "Errorcode 400:Success", 
                401 => "Errorcode 401: Failed to authenticate with the “. 
                       “Password Authority service.", 
                402 => "Errorcode 402: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “client daemon.", 
                403 => "Errorcode 403: Not authorized (for client daemon).", 
                404 => "Errorcode 404: Unable to establish connection with “. 
                       “Password Authority Server.", 
                405 => "Errorcode 405: No data found for specified target “. 
                        “alias.", 
                406 => "Errorcode 406: Application error. See system log for “. 
                       “details.", 
                407 => "Errorcode 407: Invalid parameters specified.", 
                408 => "Errorcode 408: A system error occurred, problem with “. 
                       “the “. 
                       “client environment. Unable to retrieve environment “. 
                        “data.", 
                409 => "Errorcode 409: Unauthorized script name.", 
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                410 => "Errorcode 410: Unauthorized execution path.", 
                411 => "Errorcode 411: Unauthorized execution user ID.", 
                412 => "Errorcode 412: Unauthorized request server.", 
                413 => "Errorcode 413: Client software version is “. 
                       “incompatible “. 
                       “with the server. ". 
                        "This version is no longer supported: upgrade the “. 
                        “Password Authority client software.", 
                414 => "Errorcode 414: DLL cannot locate exe. (Windows only)", 
                415 => "Errorcode 415: DLL internal error occurred. (Windows “. 
                       “only)", 
                419 => "Errorcode 419: Invalid target alias specified.", 
                441 => "Errorcode 441: Invalid file path specified.", 
                443 => "Errorcode 443: Client is initializing.", 
                445 => "Errorcode 445: Client is updating the encryption key.", 
                446 => "Errorcode 446: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid execution path specified for request script.", 
                447 => "Errorcode 447: Authorization mapping validation “ 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Invalid file path specified for request script.", 
                448 => "Errorcode 448: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
                       “Missing request script information.", 
                449 => "Errorcode 449: Authorization mapping validation “. 
                       “error. “. 
        }; 
 
        if(!defined $cwID or !defined $cwTarget){ 
                return; 
        }else{ 
                my $cwAlias = $cwID . "_" . $cwTarget; 
                my ($cwAnswer, $cwCommand, @cwArray); 
 
                $cwCommand = qq{$GETCR $cwAlias true}; 
                $cwAnswer = `$cwCommand`; 
                @cwArray = split(/\s+/, $cwAnswer); 
                if($cwArray[0] ne "400"){ 
                        carp $errorCode->{$cwArray[0]}; 
                        return(undef); 
                }else{ 
                        return($cwArray[2]); 
                } 
        } 
} 
 
sub passwdAspect{ 
        before { 
                my $context = shift; 
                my ($cwTagert, $cwID, $cwPasswd); 
 
                my @params = $context->params; 
                $cwTarget = $params[1]; 
                $cwTarget =~ s/^.*=//; 
                $cwID = $params[2]; 
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                unless($params[3] = passwdLookup($cwID,$cwTarget)){ 
                        print STDERR "\nThe passwd $cwID not found in 
Cloakware,”. 
                        “switching to passthrough mode\n"; 
                }else{ 
                        $context->params($params[0],$params[1],$params[2], 
                                  $params[3]); 
                } 
        } call ('DBI::connect'); 
} 
 
passwdAspect; 
1: 
 
 
 
Aspect Modified Scripts Used for Logic Bomb Attack 
Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux 
The logic bomb attack consists of the addition of specific code to compromise the 
credentials contained or handled within the script.  The script described under “Simple 
Script Used on Windows 7 and Linux” was modified to print the credentials to standard 
out.  The code that was added to the script is highlighted below in red. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
 
$User = 'gary'; 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:mysql:database=Nova;host=Linux-01", $User, 
$Passwd); 
die("Cannot open MySql Connection") if(!$dbh); 
# 
# Added logic bomb to print the password 
# 
print "$Passwd\n"; 
# 
# End logic bomb code 
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# 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
 SELECT col1, col2 
 FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
 print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
 $sth->execute(); 
 while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
  print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
 } 
 $sth->finish(); 
 sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
 
 
 
Script Used on Solaris 10 
The logic bomb attack consists of the addition of specific code to compromise the 
credentials contained or handled within the script.  The script described under “Simple 
Script Used on Solaris 10” was modified to print the credentials to standard out.  The 
code that was added to the script is highlighted below in red. 
#!/usr/bin/perl 
 
use DBI; 
use locale; 
use NOVA::Passwd; 
 
 
$Passwd = 'novaphd'; 
 
my $dbh = DBI->connect("DBI:Oracle:ORPCLK01", "gary", $Passwd); 
die("Cannot open Oracle Connection") if(!$dbh); 
# 
# Added logic bomb to print the password 
# 
print "$Passwd\n"; 
# 
# End logic bomb code 
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# 
my $sth = $dbh->prepare(" 
  SELECT col1, col2 
FROM novatab 
"); 
 
for($i=0;$i<100;$i++){ 
        print "\nLoop $i\n"; 
        $sth->execute(); 
        while (my ($col1, $col2) =  $sth->fetchrow_array()){ 
                print "col1 = $col1, col2 = $col2\n"; 
        } 
        $sth->finish(); 
        sleep 1; 
} 
$dbh->disconnect(); 
exit; 
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Appendix D 
Attack Vector Screenshots 
Baseline Probe Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 11 Baseline Probe Attack #1 on Windows 7 
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Figure 12 Baseline Probe Attack #1 on Linux 
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Figure 13 Baseline Probe Attack #1 on Solaris 10 
 
The screenshot showed in figures 11, 12 and 13 show the test script running on all 
three platforms and being terminated after two iterations.  Then the probe attack was 
carried out against the script.  The payload of the probe attack vector is shown circled in 
red. 
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Figure 14 Probe Attack #2 on Windows 7 
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Figure 15 Probe Attack #2 on Linux 
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Figure 16 Probe Attack #2 on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 14, 15 and 16 show an attempted probe attack on the script utilizing the 
passwdLookup subroutine held in the NOVA::Passwd Perl module.  The probe attack 
vector was carried out on all three platforms and was not successful in capturing the 
payload. 
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Baseline Logic Bomb Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 17 Insertion of Logic Bomb code on Windows 7 
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Figure 18 Insertion of Logic Bomb code on Linux. 
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Figure 19 Insertion of Logic Bomb code on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 17, 18 and 19 show a successful logic bomb attack vector carried out on all 
three platforms.  The code encased in the red rectangle is the logic bomb code place in 
the script.  The payload form the logic bomb attack vector is circled in red. 
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Baseline Debugger Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 20 Debugger Attack run #1 on Windows 7 
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Figure 21 Debugger Attack run #1 on Linux 
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Figure 22 Debugger Attack run #1 on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 20, 21 and 22 show a successful debugger attack vector carried out on all 
three platforms against a simple Perl script with hard-coded credentials.  The payload is 
highlighted in the red circle. 
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Figure 23 Debugger Attack run #2 on Windows 7 
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Figure 24 Debugger Attack run #2 on Linux 
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Figure 25 Debugger Attack run #2 on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 23, 24 and 25 show a successful debugger attack vector carried out on all 
three platforms against a simple Perl script utilizing the password vault via the 
passwdLookup subroutine held in the NOVA::Passwd Perl module.  The payload is 
highlighted in the red circle. 
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Baseline Memory Scan Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 26 Generation of the memory on Windows 7 
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Figure 27 Memory scan attack vector #1 on Windows 7 
 
 
Figure 28 Generation of the memory on Linux 
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Figure 29 Memory scan attack vector #1 on Linux 
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Figure 30 Generation of the memory on Solaris 10 
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Figure 31 Memory scan attack vector #1 on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 26 through 31 show a successful memory scan attack vector carried out on 
all three platforms against a simple Perl script with hard-coded credentials.  The payload 
is highlighted in the red circles.  Figures 26, 28 and 30 show the generation of the 
memory dumps. 
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Figure 32 Memory scan attack vector #2 on Windows 7 
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Figure 33 Memory scan attack vector #2 on Linux 
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Figure 34 Memory scan attack vector #2 on Solaris 10 
 
Figures 32, 33 and 34 show a successful memory scan attack vector carried out on 
all three platforms against a simple Perl script utilizing the password vault via the 
passwdLookup subroutine held in the NOVA::Passwd Perl module.  The payload is 
highlighted in the red circle. 
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Aspect Modified Probe Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 35 Aspect Modified Probe Attack - Windows 7 
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Figure 36 Aspect Modified Probe Attack - Linux 
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Figure 37 Aspect Modified Probe Attack - Solaris 10 
 
Figures 35, 36 and 37 demonstrate a failed probe attack vector on the Windows 7, 
Linux ad Solaris 10 platforms.  The script avoids attack by activating and firing an aspect 
through the ‘use NOVA::Passwd;’ pragma (highlighted in the green circle) and 
obfuscates the real password by setting (highlighted in the red rectangle) and passing a 
phony password to the DBI->connect subroutine.  
Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack Vector Screenshots 
Figures 38, 39 and 40 demonstrate a failed logic bomb attack vector on the 
Windows 7, Linux ad Solaris 10 platforms.  The script avoids attack by activating and 
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firing an aspect through the ‘use NOVA::Passwd;’ pragma and obfuscates the real 
password by setting (highlighted in the red rectangle) and passing a phony password to 
the DBI->connect subroutine.   The attack payload is shown in the green circle and is 
broadcasting the wrong password. 
 
Figure 38 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack - Windows 7 
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Figure 39 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack - Linux 
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Figure 40 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack - Solaris 10 
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Aspect Modified Debugger Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 41 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack - Windows 7 
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Figure 42 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack – Linux 
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Figure 43 Aspect Modified Logic Bomb Attack - Solaris 10 
 
Figures 41, 42 and 43 show a successful debugger attack vector run against all three 
platforms.  The payload is circled in red.  On average this attack took 50 debugger steps 
to accomplish. 
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Aspect Modified Memory Scan Attack Vector Screenshots 
 
Figure 44 Aspect Modified Memory Scan Attack - Windows 7 
 
134 
 
 
Figure 45 Aspect Modified Memory Scan Attack – Linux 
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Figure 46 Aspect Modified Memory Scan Attack - Solaris 10 
 
Figures 44, 45 and 46 show a successful memory scan attack run against all three 
platforms. 
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